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The Manhattan Project redefined the landscape of international security. The 
advent of the nuclear age, in many ways, reshaped the prospect of great power politics 
and the very nature of war itself. While nuclear weapons have altered the security 
environment, the literature that revolves around the subject is limited to a few select 
topics: arms control, deterrence, normative assertions on the (im)morality of nuclear 
weapons, the routines and potential accidents of organizational behaviour, and the 
boondoggles of ballistic missile defense. The literature fails to address how the technical 
operating requirements of nuclear weapons affect nuclear strategy. 
The research question posed in this thesis is: does technology play an independent 
role in determining nuclear doctrine? The explanation tested in this thesis is that 
technology, specifically the technical operating requirements of nuclear weapons drove 
the American military towards a counterforce-biased doctrine and away from a city-strike 
strategy. Furthermore, the technical operating requirements were responsible for the 
move away from Launch on Warning and First Strike doctrines. Technology, as the 
primary driving factor in the establishment of nuclear doctrine, analysts should be able to 
make key insights into the highly classified characteristics of a state’s nuclear strategy if 
they are able to find out the procurement policy of that state’s military. A technology-
driven nuclear doctrine warns us about how other states will develop in the future, as they 
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“The most important points often are the simplest ones. No one can win an all-
out nuclear war. While this statement is open to dispute, I maintain that it is correct 
and that its implications have not been fully appreciated.”1 – Robert Jervis 
 For all intents and purposes, the Manhattan Project redefined the landscape of the 
international security environment. The advent of the nuclear age, in many ways, 
reshaped the prospect of great power politics and the very nature of war itself. The 
looming prospect of large scale war has become an especially terrifying prospect since 
the Trinity test at Los Alamos, New Mexico and even more so since the successful tests 
of the thermonuclear (fusion) bomb in the mid-1950s. Anything beyond a limited conflict 
between nuclear powers is now a reason to be concerned that a full scale war between 
states that possess these weapons can only hope for a pyrrhic victory. 
 While nuclear weapons have altered the landscape of the security environment, 
the literature that revolves around the subject is limited to a few select topics: arms 
control, deterrence, normative assertions on the (im)morality of nuclear weapons, the 
routines and potential accidents of organizational behaviour, the balance of power in the 
nuclear age, and the billion-dollar boondoggles of ballistic missile defense. There is, 
                                                            
1 Robert Jervis. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 1. 
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however, a dearth in the literature that fails to address how the technical operating 
requirements of nuclear weapons affect nuclear strategy. 
 The research question of this thesis is: does technology play an independent role 
in determining nuclear doctrine? The primary explanation that will be tested is that 
technology, specifically the technical operating requirements of nuclear weapons drove 
the American military towards a counterforce-biased doctrine and away from a city-strike 
strategy. Furthermore, the technical operating requirements were responsible for the 
move away from Launch on Warning and First Strike doctrines. The alternative 
explanation tested in this thesis is that organizational behaviour, specifically the offensive 
bias model offered by Jack Snyder is responsible for the determination of nuclear 
doctrine in American Cold War nuclear strategy.
 2
 This strain of organizational literature 
has become influential among international security specialists and those who study 




                                                            
2 Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984) 
3 Barry R. Posen. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); Scott D. Sagan. “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and 
Instability,” International Security, vol. 11, no. 2 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 151-175.; Stuart J. Kaufman. 
“Organizational Politics and Change in Soviet Military Policy,” World Politics, vol. 46, no. 3 (Apr., 1994), pp. 
355-382.; Scott D. Sagan. “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,” International Security, vol. 11, 
no. 2 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 151-175.; Stephen Van Evera. “Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First 
World War,” International Security, vol. 9, no. 1 (Summer, 1984), pp. 58-107; Jack S. Levy. “Organizational 
Routines and the Causes of War,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 193-222. 
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 The state of literature surrounding nuclear weapons is notably focused on the 
use/non-use of nuclear weapons,
4
 deterrence theory, accidental use, nuclear terrorism, 
etc. Discussions about the impact that technological capabilities have on doctrine, 
however, are explored less often. David Alan Rosenberg with W.B. Moore
5
 and Marc 
Trachtenberg
6
 are examples of fine scholarship relating to this field, however, 
Trachtenberg and Rosenberg focus on targeting policy as related to bureaucratic 
bargaining, while Rosenberg and Moore present a study similarly focusing on the inter-
service rivalries of the United States. These studies, however, do not test for the 
possibility that technical operating characteristics present an independent variable on the 
selection of doctrine. Most of the literature surrounding nuclear strategy approaches the 
subject matter from a bureaucratic lens (e.g. the organizational behavioural perspective 
that seeks to simplify the operating environment) or from an arms control perspective 
(presenting the argument that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous and prone to 
accidental launch) or the wealth of literature discussing deterrence. While the geopolitical 
reality that faces a given state is a necessarily important variable, it only tells part of the 
story about what drives nuclear doctrine: geopolitics explains the why; technology 
explains the details of a given doctrine. This thesis will add to the literature by 
highlighting that technology plays a pervasive role as the primary driving force behind 
the determination of nuclear doctrine. 
                                                            
4 T.V. Paul. The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford Security Studies, 2009); 
T.V. Paul. “Taboo or Tradition? The non-use of nuclear weapons in world politics,” Review of International 
Studies, vol. 36, no. 4 (October, 2010), pp. 853-863. 
5 David Alan Rosenberg and W.B. Moore. “Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours”: Documents 
on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-55,” International Security, vol. 6, no. 3 
(Winter, 1981-1982), pp. 3-38; David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and 
American Strategy, 1945-1960,” International Security, vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring, 1983), pp. 3-71. 
6 Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954,” 
International Security, vol. 13, no. 3 (Winter, 1988-1989), pp. 5-49. 
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 The two theoretical models that are used to trace the causal story of nuclear 
doctrine will present very differing implications about how these doctrines come to pass. 
If technology has an independent effect on doctrine, we should be able to determine the 
doctrine of a nuclear state given sufficient understanding of the technological 
characteristics of its arsenal and assets. Furthermore, should technology prove to be the 
primary driving factor in the establishment and alteration of nuclear doctrine, and then 
analysts should be able to present key insights into the highly classified characteristics of 
a state’s nuclear strategy if they are able to find out the procurement policy of that state’s 
military. Furthermore, a technology-driven nuclear doctrine warns us about how other 
states will develop in the future, as they will be reflective of the technical operating 
characteristics of their assets. Should the organizational politics model, specifically the 
state’s tendency towards a military offensive bias prove to be the primary causal factor 
driving nuclear doctrine, we should see very different consideration within doctrine and 
in discussions leading up to implementation. In this case, we should see doctrine reflect a 
move towards simplified standard operating procedures and doctrines taken without 
consideration for the alteration in the balance of forces or the development of new 
technology. While inter-service military rivalry is a reality, the outcome that it predicts is 
not the desired test; offensive bias is a specified organizational outcome that has an 
impact on war doctrine, whereas inter-service rivalry is primarily about budgeting 
competition. 
 The doctrinal choices examined in this thesis are: countervalue (city-strike), 
counterforce (targeting enemy military units), Launch on Warning, and First Strike. For 
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the purposes of simplicity, this thesis will examine these doctrinal options as a “yes/no” 
choice (did the United States implement a first strike doctrine or not? Why did they 
abandon plans to implement launch on warning? Etc), with the exception of countervalue 
versus countervalue, as that will be assessed towards which is the focus of the doctrine (is 
the doctrine focused on counterforce or countervalue targeting?). These doctrinal choices 
available to military decision makers may be combined (such as a first strike and 
countervalue doctrine) but they will be examined as separate units for the purposes of 
unpacking the option under discussion. These four doctrinal options represent the 
building blocks of nuclear strategy; other considerations are primarily means of delivery 
(e.g. bombers versus ICBM versus SSBN versus artillery, etc). 
Argument 
In the technological capabilities model, this thesis tests how technology impacts 
nuclear doctrine in terms of countervalue (city-strike) versus counterforce strategies, 
Launch on Warning (LoW), and First Strike. Countervalue doctrines are easiest to 
implement: they require the capability of reliable delivery system to reach the enemy’s 
target and enough nuclear bombs to sufficiently punish a civilian population, industrial 
infrastructure, and political/governmental networks.
7
 The purpose of establishing a 
countervalue doctrine is to make the cost of war sufficiently prohibitive to deter the 
enemy or to surrender rather than continue to incur punishment should military action 
                                                            
7 Jervis (1989), p. 11; Lawrence Freedman. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s 





 Counterforce doctrines, alternatively, are much more difficult to put into action. 
Striking an opponent’s military units on the battlefield requires highly accurate delivery 
systems, reduced-yield warheads to minimize blowback to one’s own troops,9 and 
miniaturized warheads that are able to be launched by individual soldiers or armored 
units such as tanks or trucks.
10
 The use of counterforce weapons is especially useful 
because: (1) it neutralizes the enemy’s ability to strike at its cities, as well as shifts the 
overall balance of forces in their favour if it successfully destroys a significant portion of 
the enemy’s military assets;11 (2) counter-force targeting makes use of ground-burst, 
which achieves the maximum destructive blast possible against enemy targets, which is 




Due to the decisive nature of nuclear weapons, the suddenness of a nuclear strike, 
and the capacity of destruction with which thermonuclear weapons are imbued,
13
 states 
are concerned with pre-emptive or surprise attack from a rival state. Because the nature 
of nuclear weapons precipitates both first mover advantage as well as the use-it or lose-it 
problem, a state is at the mercy of their potential adversaries in the event of crisis or even 
                                                            
8 Jervis (1989), p. 11. 
9 Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter. “Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review’s New 
Missions,” International Security, vol. 30, no. 2 (Autumn, 2005), pp. 86-87, 90-95 
10 Lawrence (1983), pp. 130-132; Colin S. Gray. “Theater Nuclear Weapons: Doctrines and Postures,” 
World Politics, vol. 28, no. 2 (Jan., 1976), p. 307; W.S. Bennett, R.P. Gard, and G.C. Reinhardt, Tactical 
Nuclear Weapons: Objectives and Constraints, LA-5712-MS, Informal Report (Los Alamos: Los Alamos 
Scientific Laboratory, 1974), pp. 4-6. 
11 Herman Kahn. On Thermonuclear War (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1960, 2007), p. 
16n; Lawrence (1983), pp. 130-132; Daniel Yergin. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the 
National Security State (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976), p. 478; Bernard Brodie, The Reporter (11 October 
1954). 
12 Glaser and Fetter, p. 97 
13 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966, 2008), pp. 20-4 
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the revisionist whims of another state.
14
 Given the vulnerability of a pre-emptive strike, 
countries are more likely to have a First Strike doctrine if their arsenals are neither highly 
mobile nor difficult to locate.
15
 Said simply, this hypothesis says: the more vulnerable a 
state’s nuclear asset is, the more likely they are to consider a First Strike doctrine. 
 Similarly, states may make use of a LoW doctrine to mitigate the insecurity 
surrounding the use-it or lose-it character of nuclear weapons. In a Launch on Warning 
doctrine, a country will retaliate against the enemy after they have launched their strike, 
but before those strikes have reached their Designated Ground Zeros (DGZs).
16
 LoW, 
however, requires two technological necessities: (1) a fully reliable sensor system,
17
 and 
(2) a fully reliable command-and-control infrastructure.
18
 While command-and-control 
capabilities are not choose-able facets since nuclear arsenals must be secure against 
accidents, the technological advancement of this area of nuclear weapons may ultimately 
be a determinant of specific launch-on-warning strategies. Because of these technological 
necessities, the more advanced a state’s Command, Control, Communications (C3I) 
systems are, the more likely a Launch on Warning doctrine is to exist. 
 The alternative explanation tested in this study is an organizational model, based 
on Jack Snyder’s offensive bias argument. According to this model, (1) military decision-
makers will pursue offensive doctrines regardless of the balance of forces or advances in 
                                                            
14 Fred S. Hoffman, ”The SDI in U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Senate Testimony,” International Security, vol. 10, 
no. 1 (Summer, 1985) ,p. 21 
15 Jervis (1989), pp. 143-5; Hoffman, p. 21 
16 Jervis (1989), p. 144 
17 Michael D. Wallace, Brian L. Crissey, and Linn I. Sennott, “Accidental Nuclear War: A Risk Assessment,” 
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 23, no. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 14-15 
18 Wallace (et al), pp. 10-11 
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technical operating characteristics; (2) military doctrines will produce overly simplified 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and war-fighting plans in order to reduce 
uncertainty and simplify complex environments; and (3) military doctrines will favour 
holding the initiative. 
 Military decision-makers, because of their professional training as soldiers will be 
necessarily preoccupied with armed conflict and view the world in Hobbesian terms. 
Since this perspective does not offer a great amount of variation, there should be very 
little change over time. Military planners, therefore, will continually push for and plan for 
preventive strikes against a potential rival. A better-now-than-later attitude should be at 
the core of doctrine. 
 Military decision-makers, because of their dogmatic adherence to doctrine and the 
desire to simplify complex environments will be reticent to change. For this reason, there 
should be great hesitation to review SOPs, war-fighting plans, and targeting packages. 
Large doctrinal changes should be met with a high degree of resistance. 
 Military decision-makers, due to the overarching desire to hold the initiative and 
avoid reactionary strategies, will pursue offensive doctrine that will virtually guarantee 
that they will control the initiation of conflict. As such, surprise attacks should be at the 
heart of a doctrine that favours holding the initiative. A strategy that is designed to hold 
the initiative allows for the initiator to select the method, timing, and location of the start 
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of military combat, therefore allowing flexibility and reducing uncertainty.
19
 In terms of 
an initiative-biased nuclear doctrine, we should expect surprise attack and/or preventive 
strikes; pre-emptive strikes would not be initiative-biased because the calculus for this 
type of doctrine would be to minimize how much damage was absorbed by American 
territory. 
Technological determinism has largely fallen through the cracks in the 
International Relations Theory literature. While Jack Levy’s highly influential, seminal 
work on the Offensive-Defense Balance
20
 theory sparked an important strand in 
Structural Realist theories, this thesis does not offer such a grand explanation on the 
nature of war, peace, or even security and stability. This thesis does, however, offer an 
explanation as to how technology has an independent and causal variable in how 
American nuclear doctrine was driven during the Cold War: as they became more 
technologically proficient (acquiring smaller-sized warheads), the U.S. moved from 
countervalue to a counterforce-heavy doctrine; as the American arsenal achieved greater 
invulnerability (e.g. stealthier technology such as nuclear submarines and greater 
mobility such as missiles mounted on railroad cars, etc), military decision makers 
abandoned discussions of first strike doctrine; and lastly, this thesis predicts that as 
command, control, and control technology becomes more advanced, the United States 
will become more likely to implement a LoW doctrine. This strand of mid-range level of 
theory, linking technology and military affairs fits in with Michel Fortmann and Stefanie 
                                                            
19 Elizabeth Kier. “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” International Security, vol. 19, 
no. 4 (Spring, 1995), p. 88; Snyder (1984), pp. 15-17, 26-30. 
20 Jack Levy. “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical 
Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 219-238 
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von Hlatky’s work on Revolutions in Military Affairs;21 while that work provides an 
explanation for the technological implications of international security, this thesis 
provides a monadic-level explanation (about the state’s military policy, as opposed to the 
strategic interaction between rivals – this thesis does not comment on the stability of the 
international system) for the state’s doctrinal choices. 
This thesis will proceed by examining a longitudinal study of U.S. doctrine of the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter Administrations. The selection of a longitudinal 
instead of a cross-national study has been made to control for as many variables as 
possible. Because the literature does not currently highlight the relationship between 
technical operating requirements and their relationship with nuclear doctrine, there is a 
need to carefully examine and develop these variables as much as possible. While this 
will obviously limit the ability to generalize from the conclusions made by this thesis, it 
will provide a solid foundation to build upon for future research (should the technological 
determinist model prove fruitful). 
 The use of a longitudinal case study, furthermore allows us to hold as much 
constant, however, as noted above, it will necessarily limit the ability to generalise and 
predict across the breadth of nuclear cases. While the lack of variation in these cases may 
cause concern due to the possible confounding effects of path dependency, they allow for 
a more controlled comparison of the independent variables in accordance with Mill’s 
method of difference. Furthermore, if the presidents are under the aegis of path 
                                                            
21 Michel Fortmann and Stefanie von Hlatky. “The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Deterrence 
Stability,” in T.V. Paul, Patrick Morgan and James Wirtz (eds), Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global 
Age (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
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dependency, then it is a hard case since we are explaining and demonstrating change in 
the DV (i.e. there is a change, which cannot be explained by path dependency, or at least 
the technological model offers greater explanatory power, as per Lakatos’ Criteria). Since 
the scope of the inquiry has been limited to years 1953-1981 (President Eisenhower to 
President Carter), with the Lyndon B. Johnson and Gerald Ford Administrations not 
included in the case studies, the findings presented within this thesis cannot be 
appropriately applied to other national doctrinal programmes, nor can they be generalized 
to post-Cold War cases at this point. However, the post-Carter technological changes are 
many but small, and do not compare with the major changes between the 1950’s and 
1960s, or between the 1960s and 1970s.  To be able to make these generalizations, further 
work will be required to make analyses and predictions about (for example), Pakistani or 
North Korean doctrine. This thesis represents a first step in the direction of a research 
programme and not the culmination of a new theoretical perspective. Further work is 
obviously required beyond this study. 
The years examined will be from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidency to the 
Jimmy Carter Administration. President Truman’s administration has been left out of the 
analysis because nuclear technology was still in its infancy, and the policy debates 
surrounding nuclear weapons by-and-large revolved around who would have the 
authority to command an atomic launch. Additionally, Presidents Lyndon Johnson and 
Gerald Ford have been left out because they were vice-presidents who took for the 
elected Commander-in-Chief (Johnson from the Kennedy assassination and Ford from 
Nixon’s resignation). As such, they inherited the policies, directions, and staffs from their 
12 
 
predecessor. Most importantly, the Johnson and Ford years were too short to alter the 
nation’s nuclear policy and develop new doctrine. The last case study considered will be 
Jimmy Carter’s Administration. President Carter’s Presidential Directive 59 and much of 
the debate surrounding the Countervailing Strategy is available in voluntarily declassified 
primary sources and an additional number of secondary literature. 
The United States has been selected as the test case for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the American politico-military bureaucracy remains one of the largest, most 
complex national organizations in the world.
22
 The Pentagon and military decision 
makers in the White House comprise thousands of civil servants, presenting a highly 
complex bureaucratic machinery. If ever there was a need to simplify organizational 
behaviour, it should be in the United States case. Secondly, the U.S. research and 
development industry, as well as RAND strategists have been, historically, very active in 
the advancement of military technology. American technological development and 
innovation has not, as far as is discernible, come through espionage (such as the Soviet 
Union at several points) or the purchasing of technology from abroad (such as the A.Q. 
Khan network). Again, this holds as much constant as possible: there is very little 
contamination of the technological input from foreign sources after crossing the nuclear 
threshold. Thirdly, the United States is among the most transparent and open 
bureaucracies among nuclear states. 
                                                            




This research project is based in evidence gathered from declassified primary 
sources whenever possible. Presented as evidence, however, memoranda of conversations 
with various presidents and defense secretaries, notes of National Security Council (NSC) 
meetings, declassified doctrinal overviews, commission reports to the president and 
reports to the Arms Services Committee to Congress have been collected and analysed 
here. Evidence has also been gathered from secondary sources such as academic articles 
and books, memoires, and newspaper articles. 
The thesis is organized and divided into five subsequent chapters that compromise 
the overall project: Plan of Research, Argument and Methodology, Literature Review, 
Theoretical Overview and Hypotheses, Limitations, Implications and Significance; the 
four Case Studies: Evidence and Analysis; and Conclusions. In the Plan of Research, the 
overall project is explained and justified; the methodology of the project is also 
explained. The Literature Review section builds and justifies the alternative explanation, 
namely Jack Snyder’s offensive bias model. Additionally, key concepts will be explained 
and it will be demonstrated how they fit into the literature. The Theoretical Overview and 
Hypotheses explains the basis, causal mechanisms, and indicators used throughout the 
empirical chapters and analyses. The Limitations section describes the problems facing 
this research project, such as the highly classified nature of the material under 
investigation; the Implications and Significance subsection discusses why this project is 
important and where it fits into the literature. 
14 
 
The Case Studies chapters present the empirical evidence and an analysis of the 
findings. The first two case studies examine the Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. 
Kennedy Administrations, chapters two and three respectively. The third and fourth case 
studies, the Richard M. Nixon and Jimmy Carter Administrations, are examined and 
analysed in chapter four. Each of the case studies follows a similar format: the presidency 
is introduced, an analysis of doctrinal developments as related to the technological model 
is offered (e.g. how the hypotheses under review have been successful or falsified), and 
lastly a discussion of the evidence relating to the alternative explanation and how the 
predictions of the offensive bias model has been confirmed or disconfirmed. 
In the Final Conclusions chapter, the findings of the thesis are discussed and a 
determination is made as to which explanation offers a more compelling causal story as 
to which theory drove American nuclear doctrine during the Cold War. Furthermore, 
there will be a discussion as to where to proceed in this research project based on the 







Chapter I: Theory and Methodology 
 In this chapter a number of hypotheses about how technological determinism and 
the military organization’s offensive biases caused American nuclear doctrines during the 
Cold War (specifically deployment and employment doctrines) will be introduced. These 
hypotheses are grouped into two families of explanations, representing distinct 
perspectives on state behaviour: that of “organizational theory” and what I will refer to as 
“technological determinism.” The first theoretical perspective has achieved widespread 
currency in the examination of national security policy. While this perspective seems to 
be a sensible place to start, this thesis demonstrates that the technological explanation 
will provide a causal explanation as to the effect of changes in nuclear technology on 
doctrine in the U.S. 
 While geopolitics is an important factor in establishing state military interaction 
in the international system, it does not present a compelling explanation for changes in 
nuclear doctrine. Firstly, there are an insufficient number of geopolitical changes during 
the Cold War years that are being examined: the Soviet Union crossing the atomic 
threshold in 1949, and developing a thermonuclear capability in 1955, and U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
detente in 1971. Secondly, the geopolitical changes do not coincide with alterations in 
American nuclear doctrine: Massive Retaliation in 1953 takes place a year before the 
U.S.S.R. develops its thermonuclear bomb, Flexible Response in 1961 occurs without a 
corresponding major change in the geopolitical environment, Richard Nixon’s 
Schlesinger Doctrine was implemented in January 1974 and had too great a time lag from 
16 
 
detente to be reflective of  this development (additionally, we will later see that the 
doctrine did not reflect a more pacific approach to nuclear relations), and the 
Countervailing Strategy was adopted by the Carter Administration in 1980 with no 
corresponding major alterations in the geopolitical environment. 
 The organizational theory literature is much larger than the technology 
scholarship and comprises a far more diverse body of thought than outlined in this 
section. My goal is only to summarize the fundamentals of the literature from which 
adherents draw from this perspective. Lastly, there is a dearth in the literature dealing 
with technology as a causal factor of nuclear doctrine. My hope is that this thesis will 
begin to fill that intellectual gap. 
Argument 
 This section will outline the argument that will be made in this thesis, followed by 
a discussion about what key variables will be used. In addition, this section will explain 
the logical reasoning behind this argument. 
 The general goal of this thesis is to test whether the technical determinist model or 
the military organization’s tendency towards offensive biases presents a more compelling 
causal explanation for American nuclear doctrine during the Cold War. The argument is 
that the technical operating characteristics of nuclear weapons primarily drove doctrine in 
the United States and not the military-organizational bias towards offensive strategies. 
17 
 
Technical requirements will be taken to mean a state’s nuclear capability in terms of 
yield, diversity of delivery systems, size of warhead, command and control capability, 
and the vulnerability of nuclear assets – in short, technical requirements are the technical 
operating characteristics of their nuclear forces. 
Nuclear weapons have created a fundamental revolution in military strategy. 
Atomic and thermonuclear bombs (and missiles) have created a distinctly different 
environment in international security. According to Robert Jervis, “nuclear weapons have 
compounded the difficulties facing a state that would seek complete victory. The danger 
of escalation, combined with the obvious impossibility of winning a total war, means that 
statesmen realize the serious challenges to the adversary’s vital interests can lead to 
disaster.”23 Thomas Schelling argues that it is the speed with which nuclear weapons 
produce large-scale destruction that has altered the international environment.
24
 Bernard 
Brodie recognized the qualitative difference that “the thermonuclear bomb made the 
drastic nature of the change wrought by nuclear weapons completely unequivocal.”25 
Clearly, different scholars have noted the distinctive ways that nuclear weapons have 
changed the international security environment even if they differ as to what are these 
changes. It follows, unsurprisingly, that doctrine is guided by certain technological 
realities. 
 The character of nuclear doctrine is driven by technological factors and the 
troubleshooting of problems that are technologically-based. These problems and their 
                                                            
23 Jervis (1989), p. 230. 
24 Schelling (2008), pp. 19-24. 
25 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Santa Monica, C.A.: RAND Corporation, 1959), pp. v-vi. 
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solutions form the basis of nuclear doctrine: firstly, the threat of enemy attack is solved 
by shifting from counter-value targeting to counter-force targeting to pre-empt enemy 
attack. This works as a solution because the threat of enemy attack is mitigated because, 
instead of holding their opponent’s cities and civilian population as hostages, one can 
destroy their striking ability by destroying their military assets. Secondly, the threat of 
pre-emptive strikes and the fear of surprise attack can be mitigated by achieving an 
invulnerable arsenal that is mobile and able to achieve second-strike survivability. Since 
the threatening state cannot destroy their opponent’s nuclear arsenal with any meaningful 
certainty, a first strike would invite reprisal that could potentially destroy millions of their 
people, a significant portion of national infrastructure and economy, political and 
governmental leadership, and render much of the core state environmental untenable. 
When nuclear explosions are detonated at a high altitude (e.g. Airburst) they 
produce a less destructive blast (and emit less fallout radiation), but maximizes the range 
of the weapon; contrarily, nuclear weapons that are detonated at as low an altitude as 
possible (e.g. Ground-burst), achieve a maximum blast and pressure against physical 
structures (as well as emitting more fallout radiation as debris is superheated and thrown 
into the atmosphere – e.g. fallout), but minimizes the effective distance of the effects. 
Additionally, because of the low pressure ability of airburst strikes, they are used 
primarily for soft targets, while ground-burst strikes are useful for hard targets such as 
hardened silos, tanks, or fortified enemy units, writ large. Counter-force targeting, 
because of its mandate of striking enemy forces and structures over a limited area, makes 
use of ground-burst detonations, which achieves the maximum blast effect and 
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maximizes destructive damage against the adversary in range. Furthermore, this option 
becomes attractive because even if deterrence fails and a general or limited war is 
underway, the utilization of counter-force strikes becomes a de facto war-fighting 
strategy; countervalue, however, works as a programme of exchanging hostages. 
 The threat of enemy attack constitutes the primary problem of nuclear doctrine. 
Because of the concern that an adversary may use his nuclear assets against the state (or 
the state’s forces deployed abroad), military policy may take several steps to achieve a 
capability that may deal with this threat. One such solution to this would be to shift from 
a counter-value targeting policy to a counter-force capability to pre-empt an enemy attack 
to neutralize this threat. The use of counterforce weapons is especially useful because: (1) 
it neutralizes the enemy’s ability to strike at its cities, as well as shifts the overall balance 
of forces in their favour if it successfully destroys a significant portion of the enemy’s 
military assets; (2) counter-force targeting makes use of ground-burst, which achieves the 
maximum destructive blast possible against enemy targets, which is an efficient 
utilization of the nuclear warhead being used. 
 The counter-force option, however, requires a much more advanced technological 
capability in order to achieve this targeting policy. While counter-value targeting is 
achieved rather easily, as a bomber force has to break through the opposition’s air 
defences, this is largely a matter of pilot training combined with intelligence-gathering to 
locate targets and competent military planning. Counter-force targeting, however, is by-
and-large a more technological sophisticated proposition. In order to achieve a counter-
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force capable nuclear doctrine, yield has to be adjusted to specification (higher yields 
may be counter-productive as it would be dangerous to one’s own forces due to radiation 
and the initial fireball of the explosion) and warheads need to be miniaturized so that they 
may sit atop a jeep-mounted launcher or a sea-launched ballistic missile; the early 12,000 
pound bombs used by SAC would not suffice, as they could not be loaded onto an Honest 
John or Davy Crocket artillery piece because they were just too large and heavy.  
 Another source of insecurity is the threat of pre-emptive strike or surprise attack 
from an enemy state, especially if the second-strike survivable criterion has not been met. 
Because the nature of nuclear weapons precipitates both first mover advantage as well as 
the use-it or lose-it problem, a state is at the mercy of their potential adversaries in the 
event of crisis or even the revisionist whims of another state. This is due to the decisive 
nature of nuclear weapons, the suddenness of a nuclear strike, and the capacity of 
destruction with which thermonuclear weapons are imbued. 
 A solution to the threat of pre-emption/surprise attack from an enemy state is to 
reduce the vulnerability of the existing arsenal. This is accomplished through several 
strategies, mostly technological in nature. For an arsenal to be invulnerable, it needs to be 
able to survive an enemy’s first strike attack: this is referred to as second-strike 
survivability. Second-strike survivability is achieved by making forces mobile and 
stealthy. Nuclear submarines (SSBNs) are able to patrol oceans and seas virtually 
undetected by the opposition’s navies and air forces; American Honest John and Davy 
Crocket artillery units enjoy great mobility traversing the forests of Western Europe; 
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intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) can be put on railway cars to make them 
mobile in times of tension or during crises. 
 A second solution to possible pre-emptive and surprise attacks is the Launch-on-
Warning (LoW) doctrine. The LoW doctrine is simple enough: when an early warning 
system (such as BMEWs) detects an enemy first strike, forces are launched against 
enemy units. While these units obviously cannot defend against an enemy strike, they 
assure that these weapons (that may or may not be targeted in a blunting strike) will be 
used effectively against the enemy’s cities or battlefield assets (assuming that these assets 
were not utilized in the initial strike). This serves to mitigate the use-it or lose-it issue 
presented by nuclear weapons, as well as having a deterrent effect preceding the first 
strike to which they are responding. 
 Launch-on-Warning requires two technological necessities: (1) a fully reliable 
sensor system, and (2) a fully reliable command-and-control infrastructure. While 
command-and-control capabilities are not choose-able facets since nuclear arsenals must 
be secure against accidents, the technological advancement of this area of nuclear 
weapons may ultimately be a determinant of specific launch-on-warning strategies. LoW 
doctrines can present a very dangerous policy for nuclear weapons decision-makers. Due 
to the fact that a technical error may register a false positive on an incoming nuclear 
strike, accidental nuclear war may occur as a result of a response to a phantom pre-
emptive strike that was not actually launched by an adversary. Because of this possibility, 
a state that employs a LoW doctrine must have a great amount of confidence before 
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committing to launch-on-warning. Furthermore, since even the most reliable systems will 
encounter errors from time to time, firm command-and-control issues must be available 
to: (1) recall legitimately authorised strikes before they reach their Designated Ground 
Zeros (DGZs); and (2) guard against accidental launch, as sub-executive personnel (such 





The size of the bomb has a consequential effect. Whether or not the warhead is 
miniaturized will produce a significant effect on outcome. To be successful in any of 
these strategies, technical operating characteristics must exist so that tactical weapons are 
a feasible strategy. To be able to employ a counterforce doctrine, state must be 
significantly advanced in terms of its nuclear delivery system and warhead sizes; big 
warheads are not realistically useable for tactical purposes; small scale nuclear reactions 
are necessary for battlefield operability, since weapons in the megaton range will create a 
situation that is just as harmful to one’s army as it will to the target struck (e.g. 
blowback). 
                                                            
26 To elaborate briefly on the second point, LoW requires authorization of sub-executive delegation of 
launch orders to personnel that would not normally be vetted since they are relatively low on the chain of 
command, mechanisms must be put in place so a stressed twenty year old lieutenant cannot authorise a 
nuclear launch without provocation. 
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The vulnerability of a nuclear arsenal has a significant effect on nuclear doctrine. 
For nuclear assets to achieve invulnerability (as an arsenal), they must be mobile and/or 
undetectable, or at least difficult to detect.  
 For the technological model, technical operating characteristics will be taken as 
the independent variable. The independent variables for this model will be the size of the 
bomb, diversity of delivery systems, and the size of the yield; the vulnerability of nuclear 




Firstly, bomb size and weight has an important effect on how nuclear weapons 
can be used; if the weapon is very heavy and large, the means of delivery will be 
inherently limited. When “miniaturization” takes place, the construction of the internal 
mechanics of a nuclear reaction is altered in such a way that the weight and size of a 
nuclear “bomb” may be greatly reduced to the size of a warhead.2728 While the heavy 
nuclear bomb, which was up to 12,000 pounds in 1949,
29
 could only be delivered by a B-
29 bomber. The W31 warhead atop the Honest John MGR-1 artillery piece
30
 could 
facilitate a counterforce capability and, therefore, this doctrine was not feasible until the 
technical requirement of miniaturization was met. 
                                                            
27 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/miniaturization.htm retrieved on 10 August 2012. 
28 The author of this thesis does not have the technical knowledge to explain the scientific and 
engineering process that is involved in the miniaturization of nuclear warheads. Sufficed to say, it is highly 
technical and complex. Most importantly for the purposes of this study, the nuclear reaction that is 
responsible for the detonation of a bomb is produced in a smaller, lighter warhead. 
29 David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” 
International Security, vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring, 1983), p. 30. 
30 Stephen I. Schwartz, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1998), p. 193 
24 
 
The second independent variable in this model will be the extent to which the 
nuclear arsenal was vulnerable. This will be measured in terms of the asset’s stealthiness 
and mobility; if the weapon can remain undetected and mobile, then it is invulnerable.
31
 
Vulnerability, unfortunately, cannot be quantified in directly measurable terms since it 
requires assessing the technical characteristics of the assets: is the asset movable or is it 
left in the open for the enemy to attack it (such as bomber airfields)?; is the asset hidden 
(such as SSBNs on patrol or missiles that can be deployed on railway cars) or are they 
easily located by the enemy (such as many silos that could be picked up via aerial 
reconnaissance). This thesis posits that, when the invulnerability criterion is met, the state 
need not adapt a first-strike doctrine, as second-strike survivability has been achieved; the 
state need not hold the adversary’s cities hostage with counter-value doctrine (or threats), 
but can make use of assets in a tactical counter-force and war-fighting plan should 
military or political decision-makers deem armed conflict is necessary in crises or 
hostilities. 
 The third variable used for the technological determinist model is C
3
I technology. 
Innovations in early warning sensors, as well as in nuclear surety and positive control 
will be considered advancements in C
3
I technology. These advancements and innovations 
should contribute to the launch on warning doctrine. 
 The dependent variables that will be tested are American employment and 
deployment doctrine. Employment and deployment doctrine indicates the when and how 
                                                            
31 Schelling (1966, 2008), pp. 232-4. 
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nuclear weapons are used. Deployment doctrine, how nuclear forces will be used in 
combat, offers the actual force posture and war-fighting strategy of doctrine. This will 
provide insight as to the actual war-fighting plans and trace the effects of the theories 
under analysis on nuclear doctrine by using strategic debates and war-fighting plans. 
 In measuring employment and deployment doctrine, the DV will measure the 
significant changes in doctrine during the years investigated. These doctrinal changes, 
namely: Massive Retaliation under President Eisenhower was established in 1954,
32
 
Flexible Response under President Kennedy in 1961,
33
 Selective Options implemented by 
President Nixon in 1974,
34
 and President Carter’s Countervailing Options in 1981.35 
Enlisted as the dependent variables to operationalize doctrine, four major doctrinal 
choices will be examined: countervalue/counterforce, first strike, and launch on warning 
(LoW). 
T1: As nuclear bombs and warheads become more effectively miniaturized, low-yield 
bombs are produced, and delivery systems are diversified, states will move from a 
countervalue to a counterforce doctrine 
T2: As a state’s nuclear arsenal becomes more invulnerable to enemy attack, a first strike 
doctrine will become less adopted. 
                                                            
32 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy 
During the Cold War, second edition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 145-48 
33 Gaddis, p. 213. 
34 Freedman, pp. 375-82. 




T3: As command and control technology becomes more advanced, Launch on Warning 
(LoW) doctrines become more likely. 
 
Organizational Theory 
The alternative explanation tested as the primary driving force behind nuclear 
doctrine is organizational theory, specifically Jack Snyder’s Offensive Bias model. This 
section will offer a brief literature review of organizational theory, where the offensive 
bias model fits into that literature, and why this specific model will be used as the 
alternative explanation. 
Literature Review 
The organizational behaviour framework takes very different starting points from 
classical international relations theory. Organizations are the result of fulfilling a specific 
role and purpose.
36
 Whereas international theorists take the state as the unit of analysis 
within the international system (for structural realists), organizational theorists do not 
take the state as a ‘monolithic’ entity, but a ‘constellation of loosely allied organizations 
on top of which government leaders sit.’37 These constellations of organizations then 
                                                            
36 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 43. 
37 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, second 
edition (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1999), p. 166. 
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divide problems and parcel them out to various organizations, depending on the 
competency of the issue at hand.
38
 Graham Allison, in what he refers to as factored 
problems and fractionated power, notes that the drawback ‘about large organizations is 
that their size prevents any single authority from making all important decisions or 
directing all important activities’, but this comes out of a necessity that is borne from 
dealing with a wide range of assorted and complex problems (which vary with respect to 
importance and priority).
39
 It is in this manner that the organization interprets, processes 
facts and information, and addresses the problem. Allison further comments that this 
occurs with ‘considerable autonomy.’40 
Jack Snyder argues that military policies reflect an organizational tendency 
towards an offensive bias. According to Snyder, “the choice of offensive strategies by the 
continental powers was primarily the result of organizational biases and doctrinal 
oversimplifications of professional military planners.”41 The offensive strategies 
employed by Germany, France, and Russia were based neither in terms of a rational 
strategic calculus nor the offensive-defensive balance nor geopolitical circumstances.
42
 
Ideology of the Offensive presents a compelling framework for the primary driving 
mechanism behind military doctrine: a bias towards offensive strategies. This strain of 
organizational literature has become influential among international security specialists 
                                                            
38 Allison and Zelikow, p. 166. 
39 Allison and Zelikow, pp. 166-7. 
40 Allison and Zelikow, p. 166. 
41 Snyder, p. 16. 
42 Snyder, pp. 15-18. 
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and those who study military strategy, such as Stephen Van Evera, Barry Posen, Scott 
Sagan, Stuart Kaufman, and Jack Levy.
 43
  
More recent scholarship discusses the relationship between the defense industry 
and transformation. Dombrowski, Gholz, and Ross argue that “the posited transformation 
of the defense industry depends largely on the weapons, weapons systems, and defense 
industrial sector under consideration.”44 By and large, however, Dombrowski et al focus 
on the acquisition programs related to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
literature.
45
 How these programs lead to doctrinal changes and whether technological 
innovations or the behaviour of the defense industry as a whole, is a question that is 
largely left unanswered. 
Alternatively, Horowitz presents adoption-capacity theory which argues, “for any 
given innovation, the financial resources and organizational changes required for 
adoption govern the system-level distribution of responses and influence the choices of 
individual states.”46 In attempting to explain why some states pursue military innovations 
                                                            
43 Barry R. Posen. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); Scott D. Sagan. “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and 
Instability,” International Security, vol. 11, no. 2 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 151-175.; Stuart J. Kaufman. 
“Organizational Politics and Change in Soviet Military Policy,” World Politics, vol. 46, no. 3 (Apr., 1994), pp. 
355-382.; Scott D. Sagan. “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,” International Security, vol. 11, 
no. 2 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 151-175.; Stephen Van Evera. “Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First 
World War,” International Security, vol. 9, no. 1 (Summer, 1984), pp. 58-107; Jack S. Levy. “Organizational 
Routines and the Causes of War,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 193-222. 
44 Peter J. Dombrowski and Andrew L. Ross, “The Revolution in Military Affairs, Transformation and the 
Defense Industry,” Security Challenges, vol. 4, no. 4 (Summer, 2008), pp. 29-30; Peter J. Dombrowski, 
Euguene Gholz, and Andrew L. Ross, Military Transformation and the Defense Industry After Next: The 
Defense Industrial Implications of Network-Centric Warfare (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003) 
45 Dombrowski and Ross (2008), pp. 31-2. 
46 Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and  Consequences for International 
Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. ix. 
29 
 
while others do not, two factors are identified: “the ability to afford the improvements 
and the organizational capacity to adopt them.”47 While the book discusses the ability of 
states to adopt military innovations but, as Lawrence Freedman critiques, “to become a 
nuclear power requires a considerable financial outlay but not much organizational 
change.”48 
In another stream of the military diffusion literature, Goldman argues that the 
willingness of state elites to adopt new technologies, ideas, and practices is due to 
cultural foundations.
49
 Whether these new technologies are adopted or not is explained by 
“presence or absence of a cultural and ideological orthodoxy shapes the scope, pace and 
extent of diffusion.”50 However, it is difficult to explain variation in doctrine if external 
shocks are not present. The argument touches on the willingness to accept military 
diffusion, but does not offer causal explanations as to what specific types of doctrinal 
decisions are implemented. 
Additionally, recent work on military doctrine effects interstate relations such as 
Twomey argues that “an underestimation of an adversary’s capabilities can lead to failure 
of deterrence and efforts at coercion, escalation, and to conflict, because it complicates 
                                                            
47 Review by Lawrence D. Freedman, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb., 2011) retrieved 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67158/michael-c-horowitz/the-diffusion-of-military-power-
causes-and-consequences-for-inte on 11 August 2012. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Emily O. Goldman, “Cultural Foundations of Military Diffusion,” Review of International Studies, vol. 32, 
no. 1 (Jan., 2006), p. 69. 
50 Goldman (2006), p. 70. 
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both assessments of the balance of power and interpretation of the adversary’s signals.”51 
While this work presents an important contribution to the work on military doctrine and 
deterrence, it does not offer an explanation as to how doctrinal choices are made. 
Risa Brooks adds to the organizational literature in her study of strategic 
assessments and civil-military relations. This work argues that institutional processes 
(information sharing, strategic coordination, structural competence, and the authorization 
process) determine strategic assessment.
52
 While this work presents important insights as 
to how civilian and military organizations assess the strategic environment, its focus is 
not on doctrinal choices and military strategy. 
 While recent scholarship (e.g. since the year 2000) in military doctrine, 
revolutions in military affairs, and the military diffusion literature provides a rich source 
of material to draw from, they do not offer a causal explanation for how organizations 
determine the specifics of doctrine. This strain of literature, of course, presents a body of 
scholarship that offers explanations for several issues relating to military organizations, 
but Jack Snyder’s classic work on military organizations and offensive biases present a 
more direct causal story for how the specifics of military doctrine are selected. 
Alternative Argument: Military Organizations and Offensive Biases 
                                                            
51 Christopher P. Twomey, The Military Lense: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-
American Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 35. 
52 Risa Brooks, Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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 The first stricture of military organizations is what Jack Snyder terms focus of 
attention.
53
 Military decision-makers, because of their training as professional soldiers 
(and their duties thereof), the focus is on threats to the state’s security and on the conflict-
oriented side of international relations.
54
 This Hobbesian ontological perspective of 
military decision makers is such that the international system reinforces the prospect of 
militarized interstate disputes, and they are necessarily preoccupied in preparations of this 
nature. 
 In a Hobbesian world view where hostility is taken for granted, it is prudent for 
military decision-makers to not only prepare for war, but to make plans for preventive 
wars and pre-emptive strikes against potential adversary. This is true because military 
dictum states that there is a favourable advantage for the force that has the initiative.
55
 
According to this ontological perspective, Snyder argues that “a preventive grand strategy 
requires an offensive operation doctrine. Defensive plans and doctrines will be 
considered only after all conceivable offensive schemes have been decisively 
discredited.”56 
O1: Military decision-makers will pursue offensive doctrines, namely preventive strikes 
and surprise attacks, regardless of the balance of forces or advances in technological 
advancements or innovations. 
                                                            
53 Snyder, p. 28. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Stephen Van Evera. “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International 
Security, (Summer, 1984) vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 71-72. 
56 Snyder, 28. 
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 Military decision-makers, because of their professional training as soldiers will be 
necessarily preoccupied with armed conflict and view the world in Hobbesian terms. 
Since this ontological perspective does not offer a great amount of variation, there should 
be very little change over time. Military planners, therefore, will continually push for and 
plan for preventive strikes against a potential rival and surprise attack. A better-now-
than-later attitude should be at the core of doctrine in either a preventive or a surprise 
attack. The purpose of a preventive strategy is the (1) establish combat on the enemy’s 
territory,
57
 and (2) to redefine the strategic balance, making the adversary weaker than 
the attacking state. Pre-emptive strikes are not a valid indication of an offensive doctrine 
because they are primarily defensive; pre-emption action, especially blunting missions 
that target the adversary’s ability to destroy homeland territory,58 is considered defensive 
only when there is an imminent threat of attack. Under this definition, “the existence of 
an immediate threat and a very short time frame for decision making characterizes a pre-
emptive attack; a preventive attack, by contrast, is motivated by long-term forecasting.”59 
 This should be relatively easy to see reflected within the empirical record. Did 
doctrine reflect the prevailing balance of forces: do military and political decision makers 
base their doctrinal decisions upon the comparison of military might between themselves 
and the adversary targeted? The prevailing balance of forces ( e.g. does the adversary 
have stronger military might in terms of manpower, technological superiority, more 
                                                            
57 Wilhelm Agrell, “Offensive Versus Defensive: Military Strategy and Alternative Defence,” Journal of 
Peace Research, vol. 24, no. 1( Mar., 1987), p. 78; Desmond Ball, “U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They 
Be Used?” International Security, vol. 7, no. 3 (Winter, 1982-1983), pp. 42-3. 
58 Freedman (1983), pp. 130-2. 
59 Randall L. Schweller. “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World 
Politics, vol. 44, no. 2 (Jan., 1992), pp. 247, 261-2. 
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military assets, is the adversary weaker in terms of military strength, or is there a general 
equilibrium between the two militaries)
60
 should not be a factor if the offensive bias 
model holds true.  Did military decision makers pursue offensive strategies that were not 
justified by the balance of forces; was the balance of forces discussed, to what extent and 
emphasis was placed upon this discussion? We should not expect doctrine to change due 
to an alteration of the balance of force or advancements in technological capabilities; if 
technological advancements or alteration in the balance of forces occurs, there should be 
no change in doctrine according to this model. 
O2: Military doctrines will produce overly simplified SOPs and war-fighting plans in 
order to reduce uncertainty and simplify complex environments. 
 Military decision-makers, because of their dogmatic adherence to doctrine and the 
desire to simplify complex environments will be reticent to change. Again, this should be 
relatively easy to see within doctrine, memoranda, and meeting minutes with decision 
makers. For this reason, there should be great hesitation to review SOPs, war-fighting 
plans, and targeting packages. Large doctrinal changes should be met with a high degree 
of resistance. Furthermore, the SOPs and war-fighting plans should reflect a desire to 
reduce complexity and to simplify the environment within which the military would 
operate. 
                                                            




Standard Operating Procedures constitute an organization’s plans for specific 
actions, the coordination and codification of ‘clusters’ of SOPs forms the program for 
dealing with a situation or crisis.
61
 The sets of rehearsed SOPs guide the organization to 
select the appropriate developed program. Since a program is a set of SOPs that are called 
upon, which are already resistant to change, programs are even more difficult to change 
to particular situation. Often programs consist of a large number of SOPs. Because 
creating a new program which combines a number of workable SOPs is not easy, there 
are few programs at the organization’s disposal. An organization, furthermore, will have 
a list of programs at the disposal to call upon when a specific type of activity is chosen 
(war-fighting would be an example) which is a repertoire.
62
 According to Allison, the 
number of repertoires an organization possesses is limited. As Posen points out, the 
package of organizational programs possessed to form a repertoire ‘is roughly analogous 
to a military doctrine.’63 
O3: Military decision makers should be reticent to change doctrine. 
This leads to the second stricture is the dogmatization of doctrine.
64
 Military 
doctrinal strategists and decision-makers create the standard operating procedures 
(SOPs), college training, institutional structures, field manuals, and war plans to inculcate 
a simple, standard doctrine as well as to reduce uncertainty at the planning levels. As 
Snyder points out, this “process of disseminating a doctrine throughout the organization 
                                                            
61 Allison and Zelikow, p. 170. 
62 Allison and Zelikow, p. 170. 
63 Posen, p. 44. 
64 Snyder, 29. 
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tends to make a simple doctrine even simpler, because it must be made easily 
communicable. As a result, dogmatization and standardization make existing biases more 
extreme, whether they are offensive or defensive.”65 Biases, in other words, become more 
entrenched and reticent to change.  
 The third stricture of military decision-making is the reduction of uncertainty.
66
 
As Posen illustrates, “taking the offensive, exercising the initiative, is a way of 
structuring the battle.”67 Defense, in contrast, is a reactionary and less structured 
proposition, and necessarily more difficult to plan as it depends upon the strategies and 
tactics of the opposition. According to Stephen Van Evera, military decision-makers have 
an organizational bias towards offensive doctrines because they are easier to plan, even if 
they are more difficult (and risky) to execute successfully on the battlefield. Therefore, 
we could predict that this bias towards offensive doctrines would manifest itself in 
planning surprise attacks as well as aggressively planning first strike doctrines in order to 
eliminate the possibility of being caught off guard. 
Case Selection 
 This section will introduce the cases selected for empirical testing, namely the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter Administrations. Furthermore, this section will 
offer a justification for the use of the United States as a longitudinal study, single-nation 
study. 
                                                            
65 Snyder, 29. 
66 Snyder, 29-30. 
67 Snyder, 29; Posen, chapter 2. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, I will make use of a longitudinal case study of the 
United States against which to test the two competing theories. By controlling for as 
many variables as possible outside of those discussed in the hypotheses, we can have 
greater confidence in the findings and outcomes. While the lack of variation in these 
cases may cause concern due to the possible confounding effects of path dependency, 
they allow for a more controlled comparison of the independent variables in accordance 
with Mill’s method of difference. Additionally, since the nuclear technological 
determinist model has not been sufficiently explored in the literature, there is a need to 
carefully examine and develop these variables as much as possible. By keeping as much 
constant as possible, a longitudinal case study of a single country will be able to flesh out 
the technological variables for further research. 
 The years examined will be from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidency to the 
Jimmy Carter Administration. President Truman’s administration has been left out of the 
analysis because nuclear technology was still in its infancy, and the policy debates 
surrounding nuclear weapons by-and-large revolved around who would have the 
authority to command an atomic launch. Additionally, Presidents Lyndon Johnson and 
Gerald Ford have been left out because they were vice-presidents who took for the 
elected Commander-in-Chief (Johnson from the Kennedy assassination and Ford from 
Nixon’s resignation). As such, they inherited the policies, directions, and staffs from their 
predecessor. Most importantly, the Johnson and Ford years were too short to alter the 
nation’s nuclear policy and develop new doctrine. Lastly, the last case study considered 
will be Jimmy Carter’s Administration. President Carter’s Presidential Directive 59 and 
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much of the debate surrounding the Countervailing Strategy is available in voluntarily 
declassified primary sources and an additional number of secondary literature. 
The U.S. used different employment and deployment doctrines during the Cold 
War. In the early 1950s, before the possibility of miniaturization of warheads (for tactical 
delivery) and relied heavily on Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers, Secretary of 
State Dulles operated the Massive Retaliation doctrine, implemented in 1954. When 
McNamara took over as Secretary of Defense, the Kennedy administration instituted a 
Flexible Response doctrine, as of 1961. The Richard Nixon presidency in 1974 
implemented the Selective Options doctrine, while the Carter Administration established 
the Countervailing Strategy in 1981. 
 My first goal is to test whether the argument that states develop their nuclear 
doctrine based on technical operating characteristics is true. This will be done by a 
temporal study of the United States. The U.S. is the most obvious case in which to start, 
as there is a large organizational approach to civil service, as well as a history of 
technological research and development in the defense industry. While the U.S. has the 
most technically advanced nuclear capability, the focus was on miniaturizing warheads 
for tactical/counterforce use. The U.S. placed a major focus on tactical nuclear weapons, 
for example, a 0.1KT warhead fired from a howitzer a distance of up to 14,000m
68
 and 
the ‘neutron bomb’ with its ‘enhanced radiation effects’ designed primarily to disable 
Russian tank crews
69
 as well as tactical aircraft delivery systems;
70
 but strategic (large-
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scale weapons) were available, the largest-yield thermonuclear warhead produced was 
the 25 Mt B-41 gravity bomb deliverable from either the B-47 or B-52 bomber.
 71
 By 
1959, Strategic Air Command (SAC) had obtained 3,000 B-52s and B-47s. The US had a 
fleet of ballistic-missile submarines and ICBMs capable of striking Russia and China; 
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) were available for striking Russian territory 
from Western Europe. 
Implications and Significance 
 If my technological determinist hypothesis is correct, we will be able to add a 
theoretical layer to the nuclear literature that is able to offer a causal explanation for 
doctrines related to war fighting. As yet, there has been no systematic analysis of nuclear 
doctrine, while arguing that the technological requirements as having an independent 
effect on nuclear doctrine. It should be noted that I am not arguing that technological 
determinism explains everything, but that in most instances it explains most of the 
variance in nuclear doctrinal outcomes. However, if the technological model is correct in 
providing the most compelling explanation for nuclear doctrine in the United States 
during the Cold War, this will provide the basis for a future research programme to test 
this theory against post-Cold War America and other nuclear states. 
 Beyond the scholarly contribution, very different implications result from both 
sets of hypotheses. (1)  Should the technological determinist model be confirmed, we 
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should be then be able to determine the doctrine of nuclear states, given a sufficient 
understanding of  the technological characteristics of its arsenal and assets. Furthermore, 
a technology-driven doctrine warns us about how other states will develop in the future, 
as they will be reflective of the technical operating characteristics of their assets. (2)  
Should the offensive bias model prove to be the primary causal factor driving nuclear 
doctrine, we should see doctrine reflect a move towards simplified standard operating 
procedures and, doctrines taken without consideration for redresses and alterations of the 










 “The technological realities of this competition are constantly changing from month to 
month and year to year. Are we to flee like haunted creatures from one defensive device 
to another, each more costly and humiliating than the one before, cowering underground 
one day, breaking up our cities the next, attempting to surround ourselves with elaborate 
shields on the third, concerned only to prolong the length of our lives while sacrificing all 
the values for which it might be worth while to live at all?”72 – George F. Kennan 
Chapter II – The President Eisenhower 
While there were many discussion dedicated to who ultimately had the 
prerogative to authorize the launch of a nuclear strike, discussions during the Truman 
Presidency did not implement a nuclear doctrine of its own. The planning of a nuclear 
war was nominal, at best; in fact the Truman Administration went out of its way to avoid 
“deliberately and publicly threaten” to use their atomic monopoly.73 It is only when 
Dwight Eisenhower was elected in 1953 was the planning of how nuclear weapons would 




While the 1950s saw the last time the United States would hold an unchallenged 
nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, the fact of the matter is that the Eisenhower 
administration would only be able to claim a primitive nuclear capability. Although the 
U.S. was in the process of adding a significant number of hydrogen bombs (they had 
                                                            
72 George F. Kennan. Russia, the Atom, and the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 54 




successfully tested the thermonuclear Mike Shot in 1952) to their already large fission 
(atomic) stockpile,
75
 engineers were only beginning to produce the Mark-12 bomb, which 
weighed one tenth of the 10,000 pound blockbusters; the Americans were able to equip 
nearly all existing and planned bombers and attack planes with these new bombs.
 76
 
Additionally, vulnerability to enemy attack was still a major problem and being able to 
actually deliver the bomb towards the Soviet Union required major redundancy as a high 
amount of attrition was to be expected. Since the United States could not miniaturize the 
atomic bomb and develop a warhead, a counterforce doctrine could not be realistically 
implemented. The Eisenhower Administration, therefore, would have to rely on a 
doctrine of Massive Retaliation, which targeted Soviet cities.  
 The first thermonuclear test by the United States, the Mike Shot, was detonated 
on 1 November 1952 at Enewetak in the Pacific Ocean. The 10.4 Megaton (MT) 
explosion was enormous: “once the explosion broke through the casing, it expanded in 
seconds to a blinding white fireball more than three miles across [the Hiroshima fireball 
had measured little more than one-tenth of a mile] and rose over the horizon like a dark 
sun.”77 With the ability to produce a much greater explosion than Fat Man and Little Boy 
dropped on Japan eight years earlier, came new military applications. By 1954, the 
United States began to stockpile 15 MT hydrogen bombs; Strategic Air Command (SAC) 
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could now “destroy a city, a hardened command center, or an airfield. Possibilities for 
bonus damage and destruction of multiple targets were also greatly enhanced.”78 
Although strategists at the RAND corporation, such as “James Digby, a number 
of Air Staff planners including the future head of ballistic missile development, Brigadier 
General Bernard A. Schriever, and the Evaluation Staff at the Air War College,”79 were 
advocating a “no-cities” strategy as early as 1954,80 the reality of the technological 
developments in thermonuclear design were such that the potential for Countervalue (e.g. 
city strikes) could not be ignored – especially considering the fact that the U.S. lacked a 
means to deliver Counterforce strikes at this time. A counterforce strategy (e.g. tactical 
warfare) requires the miniaturization of nuclear weapons so that they may be used as 
artillery piece. The problem of fitting a 155-inch, 1,200 pound implosion bomb on an 
artillery unit or a shoulder-mounted rocket launcher that has the same yield as the one 
dropped on Hiroshima
81
 is readily appreciable. Additionally, however, by 1953 the 
United States was able to determine that when warheads were made smaller and lighter 
they would become significantly more accurate (as well as an increased range); more 
highly accurate weapons systems were needed for counterforce targets than countervalue 
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The development of the MB-1 “Genie” project came out of a report that was 
commissioned in 1951, culminating in 1953. In this report, code-named the 
HEAVENBOUND study, the concept of “free-fall nuclear weapons” being dropped onto 
enemy bomber formations was being explored. While the idea held little technical merit, 
it did give rise to the development of Genie, a nuclear-tipped air-to-air missile that could 
be launched from air-defense interceptor aircrafts.
83
 It was not until the beginning of 
1957 that the small two kiloton (KT) Douglas MB-1 “Genie” was available for atomic 
air-to-air missiles designed for anti-bomber purposes
84
 and, within a year, Nike Hercules 
and Ajax supersonic point defense surface-to-air missiles with a 25-mile range were 
available to be deployed.
85
 Not until the successful miniaturization of the 2 KT atomic 
weapons into a sufficiently small design was technological capability was it conceivable 
that a counterforce doctrine a realistic possibility. In March of 1956, with the final live 
fire test months away (Operation Plumbbob), the National Security Council, as this 
capability became feasible, authorized NSC-5602/1 which declared: 
that it is the policy of the United States to integrate atomic weapons with other weapons 
in the arsenal of the United States; that atomic weapons will be used in general war and 
in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President; and that such 
authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President.
86
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While the statement outlining the policy of atomic weapons integration occurred sixteen 
months before Genie’s live test fire, it was the technological innovations outlined in 
HEAVENBOUND that recommended the MB-1.
87
 While, strictly speaking, policy was 
enacted before the final Plumbbob live fire test, it was actually made based on the 
technical recommendations three years earlier. The pre-authorization for launching Genie 
in the case of a Soviet surprise attack was paving the way to make use of the asset that 
was nearly in production. 
 This presents an interesting moment in the creation of new technology and its 
effect on doctrinal policy. While it must be acknowledged that it is problematic that the 
NSC was enacting policy for an asset that had not completed its test run, the 
Administration’s decision to pre-authorize the use of the MB-1 missile with their aircraft 
interceptors was, in effect, preparing doctrine for the new weapons system. NSC 5602/1’s 
pre-authorization of command authority in a surprise attack is difficult to construe as 
policy leading technology, as they were setting policy for technology that had been 
already developing for three years. 
The Killian and Gaither Reports 
 The Killian and Gaither Reports, convened in 1955 and 1957 respectively, 
advised the National Security Council, President Eisenhower, and high level staff, 
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including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In these scientific committees, they discussed the 
vulnerability of Strategic Air Command, the importance of the race to develop the ICBM, 
and the importance of a functional early warning system. 
 In the mid-1950s James Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), was responsible for the creation of the President’s Science Advisory 
Council (PSAC). While the Special Assistant for Science and Technology to President 
Eisenhower advised the Executive on a range of topics, the technological implications of 
nuclear weapons was part of PSAC’s portfolio.88 PSAC, along with the Technological 
Capabilities Panel (TCP) produced a report to the NSC on “Meeting the Threat of 
Surprise Attack,” known colloquially as “The Killian Report,” the document noted that 
although the United States and the Soviet Union might make improvements to defenses 
(especially civil defenses), both superpowers would remain vulnerable to surprise attacks. 
Tacitly recognizing the fact that while the United States enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear 
power over their rival, this was a temporary state and the U.S.S.R. would soon catch up 
to American capabilities and predicted Sputnik in the near future: “By the time the 
Russians had acquired their own ‘multi-megaton’ weapons, the American should have 
improved their defences and reduced the vulnerabilities of SAC. There was a warning 
that, if the U.S. was laggard in this regard, it could be placed ‘in danger of surprise attack 
and possible defeat.’89 
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The first to win this race towards the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile would gain 
a crucial strategic advantage. The possessor of the ICBM would be give its state the 
possibility of launching a surprise attack far more quickly and with greater potential of 
success – missiles were (and are) far more difficult to shoot down than strategic bombers. 
It was the opinion of the scientists in the committee that, while “the United States 
enjoyed an air-atomic advantage but was vulnerable to surprise attack because of an 
incomplete early-warning system, inadequate air defenses, and a growing Soviet bomber 
force.”90  
While the American technological failure to have successfully developed air 
defenses and early warning systems by 1955 contributed to the increasingly vulnerable 
position of the United States, the Killian Report recommended that the Administration 
strengthen the existing commitment to the development of their own ICBM and 
strengthening SAC bomber bases.
91
 Although the Soviet Union was about to surpass the 
U.S. on the race to the first ICBM, the same threat remained: the U.S.S.R. was the only 
superpower rival to challenge American supremacy since the Berlin Blockade in 1948. 
Since the Soviets successfully test detonated their first atomic bomb in 1949 and given 
their capacity for strategic bombing, they remained a threat to surprise attack. While the 
coming of Sputnik made this more acute, it did not constitute a brand new geopolitical 
development. We should also note that while the U.S. continued to develop the ICBM 
and SAC protective measures, a new doctrine was not actually suggested; this served 
more as a reminder that existing plans were important. 
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The Killian Report illustrated that the Soviet Union had enough mid-range 
strategic bombers and atomic bombs (with yields up to one megaton); the threat would 
dramatically increase once they acquired long range aircraft and the thermonuclear fusion 
weapons which were only a few years away. The outcome of the report “gave the highest 
priority to improving intelligence and tactical warning capabilities, and preparing for 
instantaneous response, including the use of nuclear armed air defense missiles. It urged 
the President to proceed with the dispersion of nuclear weapons to offensive and 
defensive forces, and to grant ‘advance authority for the instant use of the atomic 
warheads wherever needed over the land areas of the United States and Canada.”92 In 
fact, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line came on line during the mid-1950s for the 
latter, and in late 1960 for the former. These projects could be directly linked to the 
Launch on Warning doctrine
93
 which would require this technical operating capability to 
be fully functional before this would be possible. 
In the spring of 1957, President Eisenhower, along with Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, Robert Cutler asked H. Rowan Gaither Jr. to head a Committee 
to evaluate a proposal about American active and passive capabilities for defense. Gaither 
was a lawyer and chairman of the boards of the Ford Foundation and The RAND 
Corporation, as well as Robert C. Sprague (an industrialist and expert on continental 
defense) who would serve as co-directors of the study and set about recruiting an eleven-
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person panel of experts on military policy.
94
 The Gaither Committee panel “set in motion 
a series of technical studies by the large scientific staff which it had brought together.”95 
Similar to the Killian Report, commissioned two years earlier, the Gaither Report 
“was to stress the danger to the United States of a Soviet surprise attack and to advocate 
measures to make America’s retaliatory power invulnerable to attack.”96 Although both 
documents predated the USSR’s successful launch of Sputnik, they shared an anxiety to 
race to deploy the ICBM and the invulnerability that went with this development. On 
November 7, 1957, the Gaither Committee presented its report to over forty White House 
officials, including President Eisenhower, the civilian secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and other top governmental officials. According to the panel, the major danger 
facing the United States “was the vulnerability of the American strategic force.”97 The 
Committee, furthermore, “pointed out that what must deter the Russians was not the force 
which the United States had, but the force which was capable of surviving an all-out 
Russian attack. The vulnerability of SAC was stressed. The planes of America’s strategic 
force were exposed and concentrated in a way that made it extremely unlikely that they 
could survive a nuclear attack. The Committee, during the November 7 meeting, warned 
that by the early 1960’s, when Russia had an operational ICBM, she would be capable of 
destroying the American retaliatory force.”98 
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The vulnerability of American nuclear forces was the central danger facing 
strategic planners, according to the briefing. Central to the Gaither Report was that the 
United States “must give overriding priority to the development of an invulnerable 
second-strike force. It urged that for the short run everything possible must be done to 
enable SAC to survive an attack. It also called for an acceleration of the IRBM program. 
For the longer run, the Report urged that the missile production program be greatly 
accelerated.”99 Additionally, the Report concluded that SAC strategic bombers and 
missiles should be dispersed and placed in hardened bunkers to limit vulnerability. The 
Gaither Report did not call for much in the way of specific policy recommendations to 
render American strategic forces invulnerable, besides relying on the expedient solution 
of maintaining the alert status of SAC bombers so they would not be caught unawares on 
the airstrip or hangar bays, but this solution was suboptimal as it is not hard to imagine 
pilot error due to a constant state of ready alert.
100
 An expedient and low-tech 
recommendation had to be made, as the technological capabilities did not exist in the late 
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Command and Control – the “Launch on Warning” Doctrine 
The Launch on Warning (LoW) doctrine is a form of first strike incentive – a use-
it or lose-it condition of nuclear warfare. As described by Robert Jervis, the LoW 
doctrine would “respond to sensor indications that the state was attacking.”101 In National 
Security Council memorandum 5602/2, the pre-authorization for the use of nuclear-
tipped missiles from interceptors: 
that atomic weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of 
general war as authorized by the President; and that such authorization as may be given 
in advance will be determined by the President.
102
 
Called “Launch on Confirmation of Attack” was the first step towards a LoW 
doctrine. That those in high level meetings such as Robert Sprague, NSC Consultant on 
Continental Defense, assumed in the 1956 meeting that “the USSR would be in a position 
not merely to launch a crippling attack, but actually a decisive attack not later than mid-
1958 and possibly sooner.”103 It was with this concern that Sprague “commented on the 
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vital importance that SAC be in a position to get the required percentage of SAC planes 
off bases and in the air within the estimated warning time of Russian attack.”104 
 While the SAC ready-alert force was a low-tech way for policymakers to deal 
with mitigating an enemy surprise attack or first strike, there were technological methods 
that were discussed to take the place of either the alert force or LoW. One such 
technological potential option was the anti-ballistic missile (ABM). The debate 
surrounding ABM systems was not, as has been argued, about the effect it would have 
upon the stability of nuclear deterrence but was driven by the technological feasibility of 
the project becoming operational. From the inception of the missile age in the late 1950’s, 
the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) had been discussing the 
technological feasibility of ABM defense as early as June 1959 – two years after Sputnik. 
According to PSAC, an ABM system could not “be made effective enough against a 
determined attack to provide significant protection for the civilian population.”105 
The limit here was not that a missile shield was undesirable, but that it was not 
technologically feasible to be put into operational deployment. The fact of the matter was 
that although political (and military) decision-makers would prefer to institute a fully 
functional ABM system and area defense to provide a countermeasure against potential 
Soviet first strike surprise attacks (or attack of any kind), this was precluded because the 
technology did not exist to strike down any incoming missiles with any probability of 
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success. In actuality, the United States was in the process of developing a rocket they 
hoped would be able to shoot down an incoming Soviet ICBM: the Nike-Zeus.
106
 
Furthermore, a 1964 study conducted by General Glenn Kent determined that an effective 
ABM system would limit damage to half of American industry and 60 percent of the 
population – while ultimately retaining only an 80 percent success rate against incoming 
Soviet warheads.
107
 While the Administration would have liked a functional ABM 
system, this iteration presented an unacceptable risk in which an 80 percent success rate 
would result in industrial losses of 50 percent and the death of 60 percent of American 
citizens. 
Alternative Explanation 
 The organizational politics model does not offer a compelling explanation for 
U.S. nuclear doctrine during the Eisenhower Administration. We should find, as outlined 
in the theoretical overview, military decision-makers will pursue offensive doctrines 
regardless of the balance of forces or advances in technical operating characteristics. 
Military and political officials were acutely aware of the balance of military forces vis-a-
vis the USSR; in fact, military policy makers and analysts were highly concerned with 
U.S. strategic vulnerability and the erosion of American nuclear monopoly during the 
later years of the Eisenhower Administration.  It is notable that, as Schweller 
demonstrates, “despite the knowledge that its nuclear monopoly was a wasting asset...the 
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U.S. did not launch a preventive nuclear war when it could have done so with impunity 
against the rising Soviet challenger.”108 
Discussions surrounding the establishment of a Launch on Warning (LoW) 
doctrine and First Strike came out of two committees, Killian and Gaither, which 
coalesced around technological considerations: the Reports were urged and overseen by 
the President’s Scientific Advisory Council (PSAC) and the Technological Capabilities 
Panel (TCP). The Committees were overseen by the same President of MIT who was 
responsible for the creation of PSAC itself (James Killian) and the chairman of the boards 
of the Ford Foundation and The RAND Corporation (H. Rowan Gaither, Jr.). The Killian 
Committee, of course, did not directly advocate LoW or First Strike, but the 
recommendations of continuing to develop early warning systems such as the DEW Line 
and BMEWS were the technological operating capabilities that drove LoW discussions as 
of 1959. Additionally, PSAC itself recommended Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) systems 
and early warning systems declared that current technology was insufficient to make 
these military systems feasible at the present time. 
In a similar capacity, the Gaither Committee did not directly recommend First 
Strike out of its discussion of American strategic vulnerabilities. However, it was the 
Committee’s findings of the imminent vulnerabilities, especially in SAC assets, that 
called for the dispersal and hardening of bombers and silos, respectively, that were 
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immediately put into place. Furthermore, the recommendations to speed up the U.S. 
ICBM programme and augment current IRBM capabilities were also put into practice. 
The second hypotheses of the  offensive bias model is that military doctrines will 
produce overly simplified standard operating procedures (SOPs) and war-fighting plans 
in order to reduce uncertainty and simplify complex environments. This was simply not 
the case. Nuclear targeting put forward an enormous number of potential Designated 
Ground Zeroes (DGZs) and the formula introduced by the National Strategic Targeting 
and Attack Policy (NSTAP) and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) 
produced a complex formula, composed of attrition, assurance of delivery, probability of 
level of damage, etc.
109
 In fact, the Single-Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) produced 
by the Eisenhower Administration “aimed for an assurance of delivery factor of 97 
percent for the first 200 DGZs, and 93 percent for the next 400, well above the goals 
established by the NSTAP.”110 This is, of course, far from the overly simplified SOPs and 
war-fighting plans that we should expect to find. Furthermore, by 1957 the Army was 
developing strategies for fighting land warfare on “a fluid or ‘non-linear’ battlefield”; this 
“transformation from a linear to a porous battlefield was extremely complex.”111 An 
uncertain operating environment was not something the U.S. military was actively 
attempting to distance themselves from; in planning a war-fighting doctrine, an uncertain 
environment was unavoidable given that a nuclear war in which both sides had atomic 
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weapons had never been fought before. In fact, according to Major Robert A. Doughty, 
the “Army probably has never experienced a more radical change during peacetime in its 
thought, doctrine and organizations.”112 
While the above indicates that nuclear planners did not pursue 
“oversimplification” or a reduction in uncertainty as a qualification for their SOPs, they 
did create standard operating procedures and routines to create a coordinated and efficient 
war-fighting plan. Learning from experience drawn from World War II, the experience 
was one of lack of a coherent structure both between and within theaters of operation: 
“with regard to close air support, no single system of coordination or control had been 
common in all theaters” and “the actual procedures employed by the ground forces, 
however, were often ad hoc and varied widely from unit to unit.”113 The post-war period 
would seek to avoid making similar mistakes, the result was codified SOPs and coherent 
war-fighting doctrines published in a new Field Manuals, such as the one created for Air 
Ground Operations (FM 31-35) in August 1946.
114
  
Ultimately, SOPs were established within the Administration not as a way to 
reduce uncertainty or oversimplify the complexities of a fighting a nuclear war, as the 
hypothesis suggests; NSC policy formation, NSTAP, and JSTPS codified doctrine and 
targeting lists that were incredibly complex, redundant, and exhaustive. However, SOPs 
did contribute a role to doctrine in that it added a layer of efficiency to strategic planning. 
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While decision makers have ultimate authority on whether or not to launch a nuclear 
strike, from the point that decision is made there are a lot of moving parts in the military 
that must work together. This is where SOPs come in; ready to carry out strategic 
planning when the order was given: the SAC target list totalled in the thousands and were 
planned in advance to reduce the effect of nuclear fratricide (e.g. inadvertently destroying 
their own bombs because they were too close together).
115
 
 Large doctrinal reviews should, additionally, be met with a high degree of 
resistance. Reviews of U.S. doctrine, such as the Killian and Gaither Report should be 
met with much reticence. In fact, both these review committees were sought out by the 
Eisenhower Administration. While Killian and Gaither underlined the importance for the 
American development of early warning systems and for taking measures to reduce the 
vulnerability of SAC bombers, the report was welcomed by Administration officials, 
generals, and the President himself. 
 Additionally, neither technological innovations nor changes in the balance of 
forces were ignored by military or political decision makers. As we have seen in this 
chapter, the imminent launch of Sputnik and the subsequent Soviet ICBM threat spurred 
high-level National Security Council discussions and produced doctrinal 
recommendations (e.g. SAC ready-alert status). According to this hypothesis, the 
expected result should have been to ignore changes in Soviet force capabilities, but this 
was not the case. Furthermore, and this was apparent in the Killian and Gaither Reports, 
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that new technology was welcomed rather than ignored. The importance of completing 
the DEW Line and getting BMEWs online were welcomed by decision makers. The 
imminent arrival of the “Genie” air-to-air missile was not ignored by national security 
policy makers, but was suggested in NSC-5602, when Eisenhower pre-authorized the use 
of this weapon’s nuclear-tipped missile to intercept a Soviet nuclear surprise attack. 
 Lastly, the perception of geopolitics did matter to decision makers. As the 
imminent arrival of a Soviet ICBM reduced the amount of warning before a surprise 
attack landed on American soil, the NSC recommended that SAC bombers be placed in a 
constant state of ready alert, to mitigate the possibility that they may be destroyed in a 
first blow. While we could argue that the geopolitical environment did not change and the 
U.S.S.R. was still the primary superpower rival to the U.S. (and given that Soviet large 
bomber fleet was capable of catastrophic destructive capability against the U.S. homeland 
long before Sputnik), the perception of greater vulnerability did have a consequential 
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“Technology is volatile. The advantage of surprise can be overwhelming. The forces-in-
being are almost surely decisive – at least in all-out war. A major cause of instability is 
the very rate of technological change. Every country lives with the nightmare that even if 
it puts forth is best efforts its survival may be jeopardized by a technological 
breakthrough on the part of its opponent.”117 – Henry Kissinger 
Chapter III - President Kennedy 
The Kennedy years began with a review of the Eisenhower-Dulles Massive 
Retaliation doctrine, even before the administration was sworn-in as of January 1961. 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and President Kennedy were both 
philosophically opposed to a doctrine in which cities were targeted and massive strikes 
would be launched against the Soviet Union (and absorbed by the American 
homeland).
118
 While there was a shift away from Dulles’ Massive Retaliation doctrine 
towards a Flexible Response, McNamara and Kennedy did not completely escape the 
countervalue targeting outlined in their doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. 
This section will demonstrate that as the technological capability of the United 
States moved towards a greater potential for a counterforce option, American nuclear 
policy makers began to move towards a strategy of Flexible Response, a doctrine that 
relied more heavily on tactical nuclear war. American technical operating characteristics, 
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however, were not so advanced that President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara would 
be able to abandon countervalue targeting as a strategy. 
Within months of inauguration, President Kennedy moved away from the 
Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine of Massive Retaliation and had announced the strategy of 
“Flexible Response.” Among the broad strategic goals laid out during his first defense 
message to Congress in March 1961 laid out the character of the doctrine: a series of 
controlled options without resorting to the total destruction of the U.S.S.R., no matter if it 
was in reaction to a major objective (like tanks rolling through Berlin) or a small and 
limited objective, as Massive Retaliation had promised. Kennedy said to Congress that he 
placed an “emphasis on minimizing risks by giving the United States sufficient flexibility 
to respond without either escalation or humiliation. This would require a capacity to act 
at all levels, ranging from diplomacy through covert action, guerrilla operations, 
conventional and nuclear. Equally important, though, it would require careful control: 
“We believe in maintain effective deterrent strength...but we also believe in making it do 
what we wish, neither more nor less.”119 
The Eisenhower-Dulles Massive Retaliation doctrine was simplicity reborn. With 
NSC-162/2, the United States signalled to the Soviet Union that they would launch an 
atomic or thermonuclear strike in response to aggression. The targeting plans outlined by 
SAC and JSCP had compiled a comprehensive list of targets ranging in the thousands, 
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which would (according to a report codenamed Project BUDAPEST) and presented to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff that the “resulting radiation [from SAC’s target list] and fallout 
would be dangerously high.”120 The level of destruction raised by a strike called for in 
Massive Retaliation was exceptionally high, no matter if it was in response to the Soviet 
Union attempting to exert military influence over Western Europe or if there was a small 
skirmish involving an American and Soviet platoon in a state that was peripheral to the 
interests of both nations. The doctrine called for an all out response. 
The problem was, however, that given the technological capabilities present at the 
time of Massive Retaliation in 1954 was best suited to this type of doctrine. The United 
States nuclear arsenal, especially during the early Eisenhower years, was large-yield and 
the bombs were big. It is difficult to get exact figures, but the reactions were in the 
magnitude of the Hiroshima, at 16 kilotons to the new thermonuclear bombs at Bikini 
Atoll, which were 15 megatons. Furthermore, the bomb sizes were long and heavy; the 
Mark-VII, which entered service in 1952 weighed 2,700 pounds.
121
  
Flexible Response was possible because of the technological innovations in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. In order to meet possible Soviet aggression with a response 
that was not “suicide or surrender,” a wide range of nuclear assets would have to be made 
available for the multiplicity of options for which the doctrine required. While the 
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massive retaliatory strike had been available since the first nuclear bomb was dropped at 
Hiroshima that levelled virtually the entire city, a very small yield was required for the 
theatre/tactical purposes for which a counterforce doctrine called to prevent a blowback 
effect that would destroy the United States Army as well as the Soviets. Additionally, so 
that the Army would be able to carry the warhead onto the battlefield, it would have to be 
sufficiently light and small enough to launch from a relatively small delivery system that 
could be brought into battle.
122
 All of these, of course, are logical requirements for 
tactical nuclear weapons. In 1961, the Davy Crockett was fielded with its W54 warhead. 
It was known as a “low-yield” weapon and a variable yield between 0.01-1 kiloton 
(which was equal to 10 tons of TNT) and 0.02-1 kiloton.
123
 This low-yield artillery shell 
would not cause damage to American forces during battlefield use against Soviet troops. 
Additionally, the Davy Crockett weighed just 51 pounds and could be launched from 
either a 120-millimeter or a 150-millimeter recoilless rifle.
124
 
The new strategy was designed to present the political leadership and military 
decision-makers with a wide-range of nuclear response options to crises and Soviet 
aggression. American response in this doctrine would be similar to an escalatory strategy; 
nuclear forces would be held in reserve, while the U.S. response would be limited and 
measured, allowing for inter-conflict negotiation with the Soviet Union. In Flexible 
Response, the president could select from multiple options, and select which would be 
the appropriate U.S. response given the specific requirements of the crisis at hand: it need 
not be surrender to Soviet interests or suicide by making good on thermonuclear threats. 
                                                            
122 “Requirements for Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Special Studies Group for JCS, October 1962. 




Command and Control – the “Launch on Warning” Doctrine 
A feasible LoW doctrine, or ABM system for that matter, would have to begin 
with a successful version of early warning sensors to detect an incoming enemy surprise 
attack. The passive defense system under consideration was heavily dependent on the 
technological capability is the development of an electronic warning system to “detect 
any significant attack with sufficiently low probability of false alarm.”125 The purpose of 
Early Warning Systems and Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line and Pinetree Line during 
the mid-1950s was to detect incoming Soviet bombers in the Canadian and Alaskan 
Arctic during a surprise attack with the purpose of scrambling fighter-interceptors and 
launch a retaliatory strike before enemy bombers delivered their payload.
126
 
The report, however, stated that the BMEW System, due to its “overly elaborate” 
design would not be capable of operating efficiently until late 1960 or early 1961.
127
 The 
report indicates that the Air Force should focus on “limited but useful capability” in order 
to become capable in early 1960 with these “necessary simplifications” to the overall 
design and mechanics of the system.
128
 As sensor apparatuses became technologically 
viable, LoW doctrines became increasingly discussed at high-level doctrinal meetings 
with the U.S. President; the fact that the DEW Line and BMEW System were not yet 
feasible, however, pushed the planning of launch on warning off the table. While the 
sensor technology for BMEWS and subsequent advancements in early warning systems 
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were being developed, President Eisenhower’s two terms were drawing to a close. The 
advancements at the close of the Eisenhower Presidency set the stage for LoW doctrines 
under the Kennedy Administration. 
 The challenge at this point for deploying a fully functioning early warning sensor 
system  were not so far advanced that the issue was whether or not intercept missiles 
would be able to hit an incoming ICBM, but whether or not sensors would be able to 
detect an incoming nuclear strike. The technological challenge for ABM technology at 
this point in time was to ensure that a functional and reliable electronic early warning 
system was up and running, which would “provide the information to alert our forces, get 
SAC alert aircraft into the air, ready missiles, wake up government officials who must 
authorize a response.”129 In other words, the same technological constraints that faced 
ABM designers in the late 1950’s were shared by the proponents of the Launch on 
Warning doctrine.  
 While the LoW doctrine was discussed as early as 1959, it did not occupy a 
prominent position in strategy development during either term of the Eisenhower 
Administration. It is important to note that NORAD’s DEW Line came online as of 1957; 
the Distant Warning System became feasible in the mid-1950s, nearly a half-decade 
before Launch on Warning was being discussed as potential doctrine for the 
administration – indicating that the technological development predated doctrinal choice. 
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Furthermore, as stated earlier, Launch on Warning required a reliable and functional 
electronic early warning system to detect a Soviet attack – it was not until 4 February 
1959 that the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEW) became operational, and 
only became fully operational in September 1960; there were doubts that the system 
would be capable of any operating efficiency until late 1960 or early 1961.
130
 
Technologically, the U.S. simply did not have the capability to stand on a LoW doctrine. 
It is also worth noting that Launch on Warning was first being considered in the same 
year as BMEW became operational but the DEW Line, however, was already operational 
two years earlier. 
Negative control (also referred to as ‘nuclear surety’) “comprises the controls 
designed to prevent unauthorized use of nuclear weapons” while positive control 
“describes those elements that assure instructions to launch nuclear weapons reach the 
forces and will be carried out if given by the President.”131 The command and control 
systems remained in a very clumsy state of affairs when Kennedy took office in 1961. 
The United States, throughout the Eisenhower administration, lacked any semblance of 
positive control of nuclear weapons. In fact, the Eisenhower’s command and control 
structure had a strictly delegative flavour.
132
 Under President Kennedy, however, there 
was a return to more “assertive qualities” of command and control:133 it was under 
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Kennedy that Permissive Action Links (PALs), “which block unauthorized 
detonations,”134 were first introduced in the early 1960s. These were “electronic locks 
that prevent a nuclear weapon from being armed without the explicit instruction of the 
national command authority.”135 While the move towards negative control fits the 
Administration’s theme of penultimate presidential prerogative over all nuclear weapons 
issues, the PAL systems were becoming available as of the early 1960s. In fact, it was 




 The Permissive Action Link system advancement increased negative control, 
therefore tightening the President’s grip on nuclear surety and command and control. 
Problematically, however, the new technology was not deployed on all nuclear assets 
even after it was first tested. While there were some in the military circles who felt that 
these systems were an unnecessary redundancy, the cost of operating the system was 
estimated to run $23.3 million dollars.
137
 For obvious reasons, the PAL system 
innovation was not tested in actual combat and, therefore, their reliability and 
effectiveness remained in doubt. The several branches of military services were 
concerned about the effectiveness of the Command-and-Control system and were 
debated; the Navy and Air Force put forward the claims that these systems would impede 
operational use of these weapons, thus potentially undermining the deterrent function of 
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  These military advisors feared that the efficiency of nuclear 
launches would be undermined by these systems. However, here Kennedy broke with his 
military advisers, arguing along the lines that the PALs were a necessary requirement for 
the security of the nuclear arsenal in National Security Memorandum 160, which 
mandated the use of Permissive Action Links on selected systems; by the autumn of 
1962, PALs were put in place on Nike Hercules, Honest John missiles, Davy Crockett, 
W33 and W48 artillery shells, and atomic demolition munitions.
139
 In this case, we see an 
example of the armed services arguing about the new Permissive Action Link 
technology, but the system was deemed to be crucial for the security of American nuclear 
forces (by President Kennedy, himself) and the order was given to implement the 
technology regardless of organizational disagreement. 
 In the development of SIOP-62, nuclear planners argued that SAC’s bombers 
should be in the air and en route to the Soviet Union upon receiving warning from the 
electronic warning system, BMEWs and the DEW Line. In a memoranda from Carl 
Kaysen to General Maxwell Taylor, he wrote that the “problem raised by a false alarm, 
whether arising from a deliberate feint or a misinterpretation of events, that results first in 
the launching of SAC and then a decision to recall it at the positive control line.”140 
Kaysen continues: 
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After some lapse of time, we may conclude that we had been wrong, and, under the 
positive control arrangement, recall the force. There is, roughly, a six-hour interval 
between bases and the positive control line for aircraft in the first wave. After recall 
and return to base, that part of the force which had been launched would require a 
stand-down of about eight hours before it was again ready to launch. Thus, there 
would be significant degradation of our capability for a short period of time after 
such a false alarm. How large it was would depend on how much time had elapsed 
when the recall was ordered. If the full six hours had elapsed, not only would the 
alert force (one-third of the vehicles carrying nearly one-half the weapons and a 
higher proportion of the megationnage [SIC]) have reached the neighbourhood of 
the control line, but 22% of the full force would already have been launched.141 
While Kaysen illustrates the clumsiness of the command and control environment 
of the SAC ready-alert scenario, the PAL system, as it stood with the ICBMs stationed in 
the U.S. and IRBMs stationed in NATO countries, as well as Greece and Turkey since 
the Eisenhower Administration,
142
 the United States was much closer to being in position 
to implement a LoW doctrine than it had previously. However, technical problems 
persisted that made LoW infeasible at this time, especially given that the (1) U.S. would 
only have 15 minutes notice of an incoming Soviet Strike,
143
 and (2) the new generation 
of ICBMs such as Atlas I could not be fueled quickly and was an unlikely candidate as a 
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  For now, LoW would have to remain a discussion point and not U.S. 
doctrine. 
Vulnerability – The First Strike Doctrine 
First Strike doctrine during the Eisenhower years was particularly intense, as the 
concept was considered, discussed, and debated between members of the National 
Security Council (NSC), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), President Eisenhower and his top 
advisors. While the debate continued sporadically during the Kennedy Administration, it 
was in terms of an ad hoc strategy during a crisis, as opposed to a consideration of a new 
doctrine. First Strike as doctrine simply was not considered during the Kennedy 
Administration. The lack of a First Strike doctrine was due to the fact that the American 
nuclear force was no longer vulnerable; SSBN submarines had their Polaris and Trident 
missiles deployed at sea where it was virtually impossible to locate them, Honest John, 
Davy Crockett and Corporal counterforce nuclear weapons were deployed in the Europe, 
American IRBMs were stationed abroad, and the Soviet Union could not hope to destroy 
a fraction of U.S. ICBMs in the continental United States. Given that the U.S. could 
survive a Soviet surprise attack, there remained little need to adopt First Strike, as this 
section will demonstrate. 
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 A First Strike option by 1961 would have come in the form of a pre-emptive 
strike. The discussions revolving around the U.S. nuclear monopoly as a ‘wasting asset’ 
had come and gone in the early-to-mid 1950s, and discussions about the possibility of a 
preventive strike was no longer put on the table; in fact, NSC 68 had rejected the idea of 
preventive war but, as Richard Betts points out, “tentatively embraced pre-emption.”145 
Furthermore, as Betts also points out, surprise attack had never been an option: “A 
surprise strike against an enemy who is not yet preparing his own attack...simply 
aggressive...No responsible Americans have ever contemplated an aggressive first 
strike.”146 
What is left is the pre-emptive strike, one made in anticipation of an immediate 
attack.
147
 During the Berlin Crisis of 1961, “the Air Force advised that a U.S. first strike 
might keep losses down to ten million (although this was glaringly inconsistent with 
SAC’s position in other forums that Moscow might have many undetected, and therefore 
untargeted, missiles). Civilian staff planners working separately under Paul Nitze 
developed a Berlin-related counterforce plan in great secrecy with projected bounds of 2-
15 million U.S. fatalities.”148 However, this option was just one on the table and it was 
considered at the same time (1) the most limited of options given the Soviets, themselves, 
had enough dispersed nuclear weapons to make a disarming like unlikely (making it an 
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unpopular proposal from the start, with little hope of being selected)
149
 and, (2) the 
invulnerability of U.S. forces allowed breathing room for negotiation. The second 
argument requires a bit of an explanation: because the United States possessed 
invulnerable weapons, the Soviet Union could not hope finding enough of them to 
eliminate the American second strike capability. As a result, U.S. decision makers were 
not compelled to rush to pre-empt before Secretary Khrushchev blunted the American 
retaliatory force. The invulnerability of American nuclear weapons produced a stabilizing 




As technical operating characteristics allowed the American nuclear doctrine to 
take on a more invulnerable character with Polaris submarines and the miniaturization of 
tactical warheads deployed on artillery pieces with NATO, there was less reason to 
consider such a hasty doctrine like First Strike. According to Warner Schilling, “the 
United States has sought to maintain not only a second-strike capability for assured 
destruction but a capability for assured destruction that does not have to be used in a 
hurry.”151 The Minuteman I (which could be fueled and launched much more quickly 
than Thor and Jupiter) and Polaris programmes in the early 1960s were the keys to 
increasing the invulnerability of the American nuclear arsenal, thereby reducing the 
necessity of adopting a First Strike Doctrine. 
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The United States would be able to launch a nuclear strike within a very short 
period of time with the development of the Minuteman I in late 1959. The Minuteman 
fixed missiles would be fired from hardened underground silos (reinforced concrete 
offered fairly strong protection from a Soviet first strike)
152
 – according to a briefing from 
scientific advisors Dr. Kistiakowski and Dr. Long to President Eisenhower while the 
Minuteman I programme was still in development in 1960, “the fixed missiles will be in 
underground silos highly protected. The big thing is simply to dissuade the Soviets from 
taking any adventures.”153 The purpose of placing missiles in hardened underground silos 
was not only to deter the U.S.S.R from undertaking any military “adventures,” but to 
reduce the vulnerability of American assets. By making the U.S. nuclear arsenal less 
vulnerable, there would be a reduced necessity to launch a first strike disarming blow 
against the Soviet Union to blunt their attack; since the U.S.S.R. would not be able to 
destroy the American ability to launch a second-strike attack, the necessity of getting in 
the first blow would be dramatically reduced. Between the years 1960 and 1967, the 
United States government built a total of 1,180 underground silos for missiles.
154
  
 While the Minuteman I went a long way to improve the invulnerability of 
American nuclear forces, it would be difficult to understate the implications of the Polaris 
missile deployed aboard American submarines. The ability to launch an undetectable 
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strike via Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) from anywhere in the ocean was 
limited only by missile range and weather conditions. This meant that the United States 
would have the capability to deploy a strike force from virtually anywhere they could 
station a submarine. The SLBM was made possible due to technological advances in both 
solid propellants, as well as the ability to produce lighter warheads.
155
 The first nuclear 
reactor propulsion ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the USS George Washington was 
deployed for its first patrol on 15 November 1960.
156
 With the ability of the United States 
Navy (USN) to achieve near-permanent deployment of a strike force capable of firing 16 
A1 missiles (per submarine)
157
 at a yield between 1,200 – 1,500 Kt (dependent upon 
whether an EC47 or W47 warhead).
158
 A single American submarine, therefore, would be 
able to launch a combined total of 19.2 Megatons (Mt) against the Soviet Union without 
detection from a range of approximately 1,000 nm (nautical miles).
159
 Furthermore, the 
U.S. could deploy a submarine near permanently, dependent only upon food storage and 
manpower fatigue – technologically speaking, the SSBN could almost permanently 
remain on patrol. 
 Ballistic missile submarines were a game changer for nuclear strategy. As the 
Americans were able to obtain higher yield and more accurate SLBMs, there would be a 
truly invulnerable nuclear arsenal for the first time that was capable of full retaliation 
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against the Soviet Union; even if the U.S. was caught unaware by a surprise attack, they 
had achieved second strike survivability. This invulnerability allowed the United States 
breathing room in crisis situations and minimized the incentive to pre-empt. The Polaris 
submarines, however, were riddled with early technical difficulties during the early 
1960s. While the Polaris submarines would be able to deliver a strike with much greater 
speed than SAC, achieving a high degree of accuracy from a nuclear missile launched at 
sea presented many difficult challenges. Whereas the accuracy of the land-based missiles 
was being drastically improved from Minuteman I to Minuteman II, the USN had “an 
array of data on variations in gravity across the seabed, gathered to improve the accuracy 
of submarine-launched ballistic missiles; geomagnetics used for navigation...Arctic ice 
shape and depth (the Arctic Ocean was a key cold war battleground for submarines).”160 
These technical innovations improved the accuracy of the American SSBN fleet and, as a 
result, a more reliable second strike deterrent which rendered the U.S. arsenal further 
invulnerable.  
Alternative Explanation 
 According to the first hypothesis in the offensive bias model, military decision-
makers will pursue offensive doctrines regardless of the balance of forces or new 
technologies or advancements in technical operating characteristics or capabilities. This 
was not the case during the Kennedy Administration, however. The decision to place 
counterforce units, such as the new Davy Crocket (available as of 1961), in the European 
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field was specifically based to counter Soviet superiority of conventional forces. It has 
been well documented that the earlier pessimistic estimates of the Eisenhower 
Administration on the overwhelming superiority of Soviet conventional forces in the 
European theatre had been overturned and reassessed by Secretary McNamara.
161
 The 
revised estimates were front and centre for decision makers in assessing American 
doctrine. “Many came to believe during this time [1961-69] that NATO could, at 
minimum, hold its own conventionally. This, in turn, buttressed Kennedy’s push for 
NATO’s adopting flexible response.”162 While the primary driving mechanism of flexible 
response was the technical operating factors made available by the miniaturization of 
warheads on small assets, the balance of force consideration was a factor under 
consideration in doctrinal decision-making, which is not what the offensive bias 
hypothesis predicts. 
 The second hypothesis in the offensive bias model is that military doctrines will 
produce overly simplified SOPs and war-fighting plans in order to reduce uncertainty and 
simplify complex environments. The Eisenhower/Dulles doctrine of Massive Retaliation 
was simplicity itself. The Kennedy/McNamara Administration pushed towards Flexible 
Response, which, at its core, is a range of options for the President to select from rather 
than being doctrinally obliged to retaliate on a massive scale for low-level Soviet 
aggression into Western Europe. When President Kennedy was briefed on the Single 
Integrated Operations Plan, known as SIOP-62, a point of discussion included was “what 
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attack options would the President have in a nuclear war? SIOP-62 contained fourteen so-
called ‘options’ based on the U.S. alert level” and, while it was advisable to limit the 
number of options available to the President (for starters, the range of possibilities were 
virtually limitless given the 800 targets included and 1,000 DGZs), he would be 
presented with a range of options to select from in the case of nuclear war.
163
 These 
fourteen preselected options that would launch an “optimum-mix” of available strategic 
forces were selected by the President and not the JCS. 
Additionally, the Kennedy-McNamara was far from simple. In SIOP-62, the 
target “list is broken into two parts: a minimum NSTL [National Strategic Target List] 
containing 2220 primary objective targets, together with 835 active defense installations 
which must be hit in order to reach the primary objectives; and the full NSTL, which 
contains 3729 targets. Since many of these targets are co-located, and can be destroyed 
by a single weapon of sufficiently high yield, the actual number of Desired Ground Zeros 
(DGZ’s) in SIOP-62 adds up to 1077.”164 SIOP-62 was a highly nuanced, intricate, and 
complex targeting doctrine produced by the administration. 
The Permissive Action Link systems episode in which President Kennedy 
overruled bureaucratic bargaining and debate between branches of the military, namely 
Strategic Air Command and the Navy, serves to illustrate that the technical necessity 
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filled by the PALs was a more crucial consideration than the organizational politics being 
played. While this should not be overstated from one interlude, the President’s decision 























Chapter IV – The Nixon and Carter Presidencies 
 
President Nixon 
The Richard Nixon years marked yet another period of technological 
breakthroughs and innovations that would influence American nuclear doctrine. By 1972, 
the United States had been able to deploy the newly developed Multiple Independently-
targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBMs (which had, 
themselves been a fully realised development only as of 1970) and MIRVed C-3/UGM-
73A Poseidon SLBMs at sea.
165
 Additionally, the Nixon Administration was to develop 
the MGM-52C Lance missile to replace the Honest John delivery system; this self-
propelled guided missile was ideal as a counterforce weapon and a choice of yields 




With these technological innovations in mind, the United States altered doctrine 
once again. In the ‘Selective Options’ doctrine, also referred to as the “Schlesinger 
Doctrine,” named after Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, the U.S. moved away 
from the Kennedy era’s Flexible Response. In Flexible Response (including SIOP-62), 
the United States planned for a series of options that escalated in severity of response, 
depending on Soviet actions (actions that precipitated the conflict or actions along the 
chain of interactions once the conflict got started): the goal of the doctrine was to give the 
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President a range of options from a limited response to a massive strategic strike against 
Soviet cities.
167
 In the Schlesinger Doctrine, however, the goal of a range of nuclear 
response options were retained, but the counterforce component was bolstered, while the 
city-strike component was downplayed to an even greater extent.
168
 Schlesinger 
introduced the concept of ‘escalation control’, “which signified the potential to undertake 
a limited attack and, owing to various ‘withhold’ options that would hold important 
enemy interests (e.g. population, socio-economic targets) hostage, prevent an adversary 
from escalating to a higher level of violence. In other words, the focus on escalation 
control is indicative of the post-MAD attempt to prevent the Soviet Union from 
dominating the escalation process and obtaining any political advantages from such 
dominance.”169  
The ability of the U.S. arsenal to present a highly destructive, countervalue asset 
such as the MIRVed Minuteman III, along with the several counterforce-capable 
weapons systems such as the 1-50 kt Lance guided missile presented a number of 
interesting solutions to serious theoretical problems with practical implications. 
According to Kenneth Waltz, the credibility of moving up the escalatory ladder would 
increase the credibility requirement to signal to the adversary that the United States was 
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serious in their commitment.
170
 A limited response would control escalation, as 
Schlesinger’s doctrine designed. In a sense, the new MIRVed assets would be Schelling’s 
“threat that left something to chance”, while Lance would provide the United States with 
credibility to climb the controlled escalatory ladder. It is worth noting that the Lance 
rockets were designed to launch an ‘Enhanced Radiation Bomb’, specifically a neutron 
bomb, this capability did not come into existence until 1981; until the enhanced radiation 




Vulnerability – First Strike Doctrine 
 While the United States was concerned as the Soviet Union approached nuclear 
parity, the Nixon Administration did not seriously consider first strike doctrine as a 
feasible strategy. This was, however, not due to an organizational bias against instigating 
nuclear warfare; American security policy makers did not consider striking the Soviet 
Union first because they did not have the capability to do so. In a memorandum of 
conversation, dated 1971, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger is recorded as 
saying: “we have no disarming capability against the USSR but we do have some against 
China. But we cannot use our land-based missiles against China (over USSR); we have to 
use our bombers and submarines. Thus, we must decide whether to dedicate a part of our 
force. And do we have the intelligence capability to define the targets? As long as we 
have a disarming capability we can use it to regulate their actions in local situations.”172 
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 While the above excerpt illustrates the Administration’s position vis-a-vis first 
strike doctrine, they were not a major point of discussion in the early 1970s. The U.S. 
was concerned about crisis stability vis-a-vis the “prelaunch survivability of its fixed-site 
ICBMs,”173 the solution of a disarming blow in a crisis was not dually considered. 
Instead, the United States reconsidered the Kennedy/McNamara Administration’s 
Flexible Response solution in the form of ‘Selective Options.’ While the Flexible 
Response doctrine “derived from having many preplanned target sets from which to 
choose and from force capabilities, such as retargeting capability and employment 
adaptability. Selectivity, on the other hand, was a function of target grouping – that is, the 
number and types of targets – and of minimizing collateral damage.”174 As is evident 
from the consideration of a “selective” version of McNamara’s doctrine, we can see a 
mix of selecting options and achieving the capability of the Kennedy Administration in 
terms of achieving flexibility (e.g. moving away from assured destruction) and towards 
the goal of damage limitation in the hope of keeping nuclear fighting as a limited war 
engagement. 
While the Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) capability had the potential to 
be used for counterforce strikes, they are traditionally used for countervalue targeting; in 
fact, only about five Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarines (counterforce capable 
SLBMs) were assigned to NATO forces out of a total 80 Polaris and/or Poseidon 
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 The reason why the FBM-capable submarines did not fill the gap in 
counterforce capabilities was due to the technical difficulties in striking from a rolling 
sea, which made potential strikes against enemy forces highly inaccurate; furthermore, 
the requirements for striking Soviet cities from SLBMs was far less exacting.
176
 With the 
MIRV development in 1970, the potential for counterforce doctrine was beginning to 
become technologically feasible for the first time as the lynchpin of the American nuclear 
strategy. The deployment of MIRVed missiles would give the United States the 
capability of a robust counterforce capability against Soviet bomber bases and ICBMs 
before they were launched.
177
 
 While first strike doctrines were briefly and very sporadically discussed by the 
Nixon Administration, these conversations did not seriously constitute a cornerstone of 
American nuclear doctrine. In actuality, the purpose of Henry Kissinger’s discussion of a 
first strike option against the People’s Republic of China served to illustrate the point that 
it was not tactically feasible to launch this type of strike against their rivals in the Soviet 
Union. There were two reasons the United States did not consider launching a first strike 
attack against the U.S.S.R.: (1) American nuclear assets were not sufficient to disarm the 
Soviet Union, thus depriving their enemy of a substantial capability to respond in kind; 
(2) Launching a first strike against the Soviet Union was simply unnecessary. In any 
given aggressive nuclear action taken by the U.S.S.R., the United States possessed a 
nuclear arsenal that would be able to respond with a substantial second strike.  
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 The Defense Program Review Committee concluded that the necessities of 
developing a Limited War doctrine required greater technological requirements than 
previous strategies were built upon. Limited War planning burdened doctrinal planning 
by placing stringent technological requirements on retargeting systems (which were not 
yet developed), enhanced accuracy and guidance abilities, as well as hard-target kill 
capabilities. The biggest of these requirements was the ability to re-target missiles after 
they had left their silos and submarines. “Not knowing the political, the objectives to be 
achieved, or the signal to be sent, the United States needed to have a great flexibility in 
its targeting capacity, which depended on it having a sure capability to strike very hard 
targets, as well as other targets of interest.”178 
Alternative Explanation 
 In the offensive bias model, military decision makers will pursue offensive 
doctrines regardless of the balance of forces or advances in technical operating 
characteristics. The hypothesis that the military will pursue offensive doctrines regardless 
of the balance of forces is falsified. The discussion surrounding pre-emptive or 
preventive action versus the U.S.S.R. was rejected (partially) upon the basis that the 
Soviet military had virtually reached nuclear parity with the United States and any 
attempt, therefore, to disarm their opposition could not be successfully undertaken 
without rendering themselves catastrophically vulnerable to a retaliatory strike. 
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 Secondly, the offensive bias hypotheses predict that military doctrine will produce 
overly simplified standard operating procedures and war-fighting plans in order to reduce 
uncertainty and simplify complex environments. The Nixon/Kissinger Schlesinger 
Doctrine was far from an overly simplified procedure. The Richard Nixon years became 
increasingly complex in developing a doctrine that would significantly “add to the 
number of preplanned strikes in the SIOP which entail the use of less than all of its 
strategic forces and to design strikes that would use far smaller numbers of warheads than 
did the options previously planned for the SIOP.”179 The addition of preplanned strikes 
coupled with the balancing act of holding a sufficient reserve force was a complex task 
for military planners. The expansion of American nuclear targeting policy enshrined in 
Selective Options built on Secretary McNamara’s earlier “emphasis on flexible no-cities 
targeting, focused on smaller, flexible, and selective nuclear options.”180  
 Additionally, the Schlesinger Doctrine created a more complex doctrine in a 
similar way to the Kennedy Administration. As was noted in the last chapter, SIOP-62 
culminated in the President choosing among fourteen nuclear strike options. The new 
doctrine and SIOP were designed to give the president more flexibility in the execution of 
nuclear strikes and represented a “sensitive person’s response to the suicide-or-surrender 
scenarios of yesteryear.”181 SIOP-5 continues along the same lines as SIOP-62 during the 
Kennedy Administration, where the President selects from a group of pre-planned 
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targeting options; in the case of the Schlesinger SIOP, this version is more nuanced and 
includes more counterforce options for Presidential consideration.
182
 
Lastly, as a note on potential geopolitical variables influencing the establishment 
of nuclear doctrine, it is worth noting that East-West normalization of diplomatic 
relationships appears to have not had an effect on doctrine. The Nixon Administration 
was marked by a period of detente with the Soviet Union, characterized by a sense of 
partnership to establish arms control guidelines, as two Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaties were signed. Although there appeared to be a thawing of tensions between the 
two superpowers, the Schlesinger Doctrine went ahead, establishing a dynamic of inter-
strike bargaining,
183
 and a series of counterforce options, and the creation of a new Single 





 The Carter Administration was one of the most interesting periods in terms of 
nuclear analysis. Jimmy Carter took office under circumstances that were less dramatic 
and tense than Richard Nixon. While the Soviet Union was approaching strategic parity 
with the U.S., Carter took office with a mind to wind down the Cold War arms race and 
bring the American arsenal under control. Initially, President Carter sought to persuade 
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the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accept the idea that they had rejected twenty 
years prior: the concept of minimum deterrence.
185
 However, with the military 
establishment in the middle of a crucial debate about the necessity for the development of 
measures to “cope with the Soviet Union’s new generation of more accurate missiles,”186 
Whereas Carter initially hoped to reduce the U.S. arsenal to 200 SSBNs,
187
 he led the 
charge to incorporate “new weapons into a new and better national strategy.”188  
 PD-59 and the “Countervailing Strategy” 
President Carter’s Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59 nominally reaffirmed 
American commitment to the strategic policy of nuclear deterrence, while introducing a 
harder-line approach to Soviet actions. The position of the Carter Administration would 
be to demonstrate to the Soviets that any aggressive action could lead to not plausibly 
lead to victory. According to PD-59: 
To continue to deter in an era of strategic (as well as conventional) forces such than 
in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that 
no plausible outcome would represent a victory on any plausible definition of 
victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to 
terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical, if 
deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the 
adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are 
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unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gain, from having initiated an 
attack.189 
PD-59 suggested that the nuclear strategy of the United States would, going forward, 
overtly demonstrate that any Soviet revisionism would be met with overwhelming force, 
so that any victory would necessarily be pyrrhic. Furthermore, Carter made direct 
reference to the necessity of an American war-fighting (even war-winning) strategy. It 
was this presidential directive that ultimately became the administration’s 
“Countervailing Strategy.” 
 The Countervailing Strategy was an advancement of the Nixon Administration’s 
Schlesinger Doctrine. While Flexible Response was the first doctrine to move away from 
‘suicide or surrender’ and produce a range of response options for the President besides 
targeting Soviet cities, the Schlesinger Doctrine in 1973 outlined a strategy of ‘controlled 
escalation’ that would allow for inter-conflict bargaining. “Ultimately, PD-59 attempts to 
deny the Soviet leadership the perception that nuclear war is winnable at any level of 
conflict.”190 This was made possible due to increases in technological capabilities made 
under the Carter Administration, as will be demonstrated in this section. 
 The Countervailing Strategy, at its heart, was a doctrine designed to allow the 
president strategic and tactical options over the full range of contingencies.
191
 While this 
doctrine is clearly not a first-strike doctrine, it is a strategy of deterrence under what 
nuclear policymakers determined to be the full breadth of Soviet responses – indeed, this 
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was meant to be the strongest possible second-strike doctrine.
192
 The Countervailing 
Strategy was meant to discourage the Soviet Union from any attempt at achieving 
revisionist goals; the doctrine had a decidedly war-fighting flavour to it. The U.S.S.R. 
would surely understood that the U.S. would not credibly attack Soviet cities in a full-
scale countervalue response, according to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the United 
States could attack “in a selective and measured way, a range of military, industrial, and 
political control targets, while retaining an assured destructive capability in reserve.”193 
While President Carter’s new strategy placed less importance on the countervalue aspects 
of nuclear deterrence, it now gave “priority to attacking military targets in the Soviet 
Union rather than to destroying cities and industrial complexes.”194 
The United States would seek to plan for the worst-case scenario (e.g. deterrence 
failure resulting in a general nuclear war) with the most detailed war-fighting strategy in 
American history; military and political decision makers would seek to maximize their 
chances before a prospective nuclear conflict presented itself. The emphasis in this war-
fighting doctrine was a distinctly counterforce-slanted. According to Sovietologist Henry 
Trofimenko, “practically all the new U.S. systems of strategic offensive weapons now 
being deployed have counterforce capability. Examples include Trident I (let alone 
Trident II which is still at the development stage), strategic cruise missiles, the new and 
more powerful MARK-12A warheads with a more accurate guidance system for 
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Minuteman and finally, the MX mobile ICBM now being built.”195 Significantly, this 
comes just on the heels of the enhanced radiation version of the W70 warhead coupled to 
the Lance guided missile.
196
 The enhanced radiation, also referred to as the ‘neutron 
bomb’ presented some capabilities that were unheard of with existing warheads: “[First] 
since heat and blast are limited to the immediate zone around the blast, it is thus argued 
that there would be less damage to buildings and landscape than with other weapons. 
Secondly, since there is virtually no residual radiation from the weapons (other than the 
radiation from the fission trigger), forces could occupy the attacked area within a matter 
of hours without special protective clothing and without fear of contamination. Third, if 
the armor were attacked outside the limited area where heat and blast effects occur but 
inside the zone of intense radioactive heat...the tanks themselves would be largely 
undamaged and could be appropriated for NATO use.”197  
With the development of the MX missile, the United States was in a far greater 
position to launch blunting strikes against the Soviet Union than during any other time 
during the nuclear era. With the MX breakthrough, the U.S. had finally obtained the 
capability to destroy the hardened Soviet missile silos that prevented them from 
launching a blunting strike.
198
 This was especially important, as Soviet hardened silos 
were up to twice as effective as the hardness of the American hardened silos; U.S. silos 
would be able to withstand blast pressures up to 2,000 pounds per square inch, while the 
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figures for the Soviet Union was 2,000 – 4,000 pounds per square inch.199 While the MX 
programme was the most expensive (on a per missile basis it reached $189 million each 
when used in conjunction with an ICBM)
200
 the development of this penetrating warhead 
allowed the targeting of Soviet silos as DGZs for the first time. With the ability to destroy 
hardened silos, the United States’ tactical/theatre capability was able to take on a 
distinctly counterforce bias, which is heavily reflected in President Carter’s 
Countervailing Strategy of the 1980s. In fact, it is these capabilities that allowed U.S. 
nuclear strategists to put into place the doctrine envisioned by the Kennedy and Nixon 
Administrations: a nuclear doctrine of deterrence that “was focused on a threat to destroy 
Soviet leadership and military targets, rather than Soviet society at large.”201 The 
Countervailing Strategy, with its heavily focused-counterforce bias is consistent with the 
prediction that advanced technical operating characteristics will lead to nuclear doctrine 
that is slanted, to a great degree, towards counterforce use. 
First Strike Doctrine 
 The introduction of the Countervailing Strategy was tantamount to a declaration 
that the United States would not attack the Soviet Union in either a first strike or 
preventive attack. President Carter’s Countervailing Strategy confidently illustrated that 
the U.S. was prepared with virtually any contingent strategy to meet virtually any Soviet 
aggression. Although the prospect of absorbing a first strike from the Soviet Union was 
(obviously) an extremely unpleasant proposition, tactical and strategic forces would not 
be in a position of vulnerability vis-a-vis their Soviet adversaries should Secretary 
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General Leonid Brezhnev attempt a disarming strike against American nuclear forces. By 
the year 1980 the United States presented a number of survivable second strike assets in 
the form of the 37 ballistic submarines (5 Polaris, 31 Poseidon, and 1 Trident SSBNs),
202
 
the development of the mobile MX ICBM system,
203
 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 
GLCM cruise missiles deployed in the European theatre,
204
 as well as various nuclear-
capable delivery systems and the bomber component of the TRIAD. 
 The Countervailing Strategy represented an affirmation that U.S. nuclear strategy 
would be a second strike employment policy.
205
 As Walter Slocombe articulates, 
“deterrence will be enhanced by our countervailing strategy to the degree that the USSR 
recognizes that aggression entails not only the risk of unlimited retaliation against the 
whole Soviet target system, but also the choice of a more selective and measured 
response that would itself be so devastating as to deny any advantage from having 
initiated the conflict.”206 The Carter doctrine was overtly deterrent (to a far greater degree 
than the Kennedy or Nixon doctrines) and, therefore, reactionary in its employment 
implications. Additionally, the Countervailing Strategy enhanced the credibility of 
American doctrine, as “unlimited retaliation” was not the overwhelming response to 
Soviet aggression, but there existed a feasible potential to strike at Soviet military targets. 
This allowed the United States to respond to lower levels of aggression without having to 
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immediately strike at Soviet cities (or industrial/economic targets which were, again, 
usually located near urban areas). 
 The ability of the United States to strike virtually any Soviet asset, especially in 
hardened ICBM silos, in effect made American forces even less vulnerable. The fleet of 
SSBNs were continuously deployed throughout waters adjacent to the Soviet Union, 
thereby making the US an invulnerable force – along with the inclusion of several forms 
of mobile ground units. However, these assets had been available and deployed since the 
Kennedy presidency – and first strike doctrine no longer held much stray in subsequent 
administrations. Because the United States could now launch a blunting strike against the 
U.S.S.R., the Soviet Union could be more easily deterred and American forces were now 
thought as invulnerable to a greater degree, combined with the heightened vulnerability 
of their Soviet counterparts. 
Launch on Warning 
 There is no evidence to suggest that the Carter Administration had a Launch on 
Warning doctrine on the books; in fact, there does not seem to be any high-level policy 
documents even discussing the doctrine. American nuclear policy has had a tenuous 
relationship with LoW doctrines throughout the nuclear era. Policymakers have 
considered pre-emption and, at times, preventive action especially during the Harry 
Truman Administration, “the U.S. has consistently rejected the launch-on-warning option 
in its declaratory policy”207 but, as we have seen before, have considered pre-
authorization and “launch on confirmation of attack.” Technological innovations during 
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the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, such as the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 
(BMEWS) seemed to be leading nuclear doctrine towards a LoW doctrine. 
 Command and Control grew with several technological innovations: early 
warning systems such as BMEWS triggered alerts of a potential incoming nuclear strike 
and Permissive Action Links (PALs) created control mechanisms designed to prohibit 
unauthorized launch. In the 1970s, command and control was extended to communication 
and intelligence – thus, C3I. Technological innovations such as Very Low Frequency 
(VLF), Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) wavelengths were designed to communicate 
with deployed Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarines, and navigational technologies 
such as the Ships Inertial Navigation System (SINS) allowed FBMs and SSBNs to 
traverse the oceans and patrol enemy coastlines in deterrent missions. 
 As these new C
3
I technologies evolved, however, they became more tenuous. The 
prediction that as C
3
I technologies become more advanced, LoW doctrines become more 
likely to be adopted has been falsified. While counterforce doctrines demanded 
innovations in command, control, communication, and intelligence, these systems 
became increasingly vulnerable to enemy subversion, interference, and destruction. Even 
if counterforce doctrines remained the goal of American nuclear strategists, a LoW 
doctrine emphasis became less and less feasible. As Desmond Ball explains, by the 1980s 
C
3
I systems become increasingly vulnerable to the Soviet Union. Early warning systems 
are subject to dangerous false alarms; radar sites, communication stations, and satellite 
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 systems are generally more vulnerable to the blast effects of nuclear 
weapons than are the strategic forces, and have various peculiar vulnerabilities as well – 
susceptibility to electromagnetic pulse, electronic jamming, deception, etc.”209 Ironically, 
as C
3
I systems became more technologically advanced they became more vulnerable to 
their adversary – LoW doctrines became less and less feasible as technical operating 
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 This thesis examined the causal role technological capabilities, specifically the 
technical operating characteristics, played in the determination of American nuclear 
doctrine during the Cold War. The research question of this thesis is: what was the 
driving force behind nuclear doctrine in the United States during the middle years of the 
Cold War (comprising the Eisenhower until the Jimmy Carter Administrations). If, as 
political scientists usually assume bureaucratic politics and military decision makers have 
a propensity towards offensive biases, analysts need to look at how the state’s military 
organization behaves. Furthermore, doctrine will have an offensive flavour and nuclear 
strategy will proceed to be highly aggressive, and likely unstable. If, however, nuclear 
doctrine is largely determined by the technical operating characteristics of the available 
technology, a much different story is told: doctrine need not be offensive and aggressive, 
but its character is reflective of the technical operating characteristics of the state’s 
weapons and weapons systems. 
 This chapter serves as both the conclusion and a note on the necessity of further 
research into this research programme. Firstly, this section will review the analyses of the 
empirical record through the two frameworks outlined in the theoretical chapter, e.g. the 
technological model and the offensive bias model. Secondly, some brief conclusions will 
be drawn, although they will be tempered through the limited longitudinal analysis that 
comprises the presented case studies. Thirdly, I will discuss some thoughts as to how this 
research project should proceed moving forward. 
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 The main empirical component of this thesis is the examination of four U.S. 
presidencies, namely Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy 
Carter. These case studies represent the evolution of American technology during the 
Cold War, ranging from a primitive capability under President Eisenhower that possessed 
only a fission reaction, no miniaturization capability, and was highly vulnerable to an 
enemy first strike, to an advanced capability under the Carter Administration.  These four 
presidencies are equally drawn from the Democratic Party (Kennedy and Carter) and the 
Republican Party (Eisenhower and Nixon), which should control for political skewness, 
at least on average.  
Argument and Hypotheses 
 This thesis argues that American nuclear doctrine during the Cold War was 
primarily driven by technical operating characteristics of nuclear weapons. Given specific 
technical operating characteristics based on the technological capability of the nuclear 
weapons possessed by the United States between the years 1953-1981, military decision 
makers produced doctrine based on these characteristics. 
 Military doctrine is inextricably linked to the capabilities a state possesses; what 
the armed services of a state plans to do on the battlefield cannot be accomplished, or at 
all considered if it does not possess the tools to succeed at a given task.  The choices of 
tools at the disposal of military planners are far more limited: there are far fewer types of 
assets to draw from. Additionally, nuclear weapons are driven, to an enormous extent, by 
research and development, changes in the accuracy, delivery mechanisms available, 
warhead sizes, yield strength, command, control, and communications systems (C
3
I) – all 
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of this serves to demonstrate that nuclear weapons, at their very core, are technologically 
driven. It should not be surprising, therefore, that what the military is able to do with 
nuclear weapons should also be driven by technological factors.  
 While the United States was in the primitive stages nuclear doctrine reflected a 
countervalue (e.g. city strike) strategy. The purpose of establishing a countervalue 
doctrine is to make the cost of war sufficiently prohibitive to deter the enemy or to 
surrender rather than continue to incur punishment should military action begin. 
Countervalue doctrines are easiest to implement: they require the capability of reliable 
delivery system to reach the enemy’s target and enough nuclear bombs to sufficiently 
punish a civilian population, industrial infrastructure, and political/governmental 
networks. Countervalue strategies require a few fission bombs to get through an enemy’s 
air defense network and reach their target; bombers can be used instead of ballistic 
missiles (and therefore a miniaturized warhead is not crucial) and it does not have to be 
highly accurate. 
 Counterforce doctrines, however, are more nuanced and technologically difficult 
strategies to employ. Delivery mechanisms must include miniaturized nuclear warheads 
that can be distributed to infantry or armoured units; miniaturization requires a high 
degree of technological proficiency. Additionally, counterforce-capable weapons must be 
highly accurate in order to strike enemy forces. Also, the yield strength of the weapon 
cannot be so high that it would be just as destructive to one’s own forces. Lastly, there 
must be a diversity of delivery systems so that military planners can produce a coherent 
and fluid plan of operations. Because the technical operating characteristics of weapons 
are more (or less) appropriate to either counterforce or countervalue doctrines, we expect 
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that the availability of these weapons or weapons systems would influence what doctrine 
was implemented. 
 Nuclear weapons are sudden and decisive weapons. As result of this fact, states 
are concerned with the possibility that a rival may pre-empt or launch a surprise attack. 
Because of this first move advantage, the possibility of being caught unawares is a 
constant source of insecurity in the nuclear environment. This is especially present if the 
state’s arsenal is vulnerable, that is, it lacks mobility and/or stealth qualities such as 
present in nuclear ballistic submarines or ground mobile nuclear weapons. The more 
vulnerable a state’s nuclear arsenal is, the more likely it is to have a doctrine of First 
Strike. 
 States may make use of a Launch on Warning (LoW) doctrine to mitigate the 
insecurity that comes from the use-it or lose-it character of nuclear weapons. With a LoW 
doctrine, a country will launch their nuclear weapons when it becomes reasonably clear 
that the opposition has taken the first blow. This doctrine, however, requires two 
technological necessities: (1) a fully reliable sensor system, and (2) a fully reliable 
command-and-control infrastructure. While command-and-control capabilities are not 
choose-able facets since nuclear arsenals must be secure against accidents, the 
technological advancement of this area of nuclear weapons may ultimately be a 
determinant of specific launch-on-warning strategies. Because of these technological 
necessities, at the outset of this thesis the hypothesis was that the more advanced a state’s 
Command, Control, Communications (C
3
I) systems are, the more likely a Launch on 
Warning doctrine is to exist. 
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Evidence from Case Studies 
Countervalue versus Counterforce 
 The record from the case studies confirms the expectation that the technical 
operating characteristics of nuclear weapons drove the decision to adopt a countervalue 
or counterforce doctrine in American strategy during the Cold War. During the 
Eisenhower Administration, Defense Secretary Dulles established a doctrine of Massive 
Retaliation. While President Eisenhower was uncomfortable with the idea of holding 
cities hostage, in 1953 the Mark-12 1,000 pound bomb was put into production, and this 
was a step forward towards miniaturization as its predecessor was a 10,000 pound bomb. 
These bombs, of course, could only be delivered from a Strategic Air Command bomber 
sortie; it was not possible to equip infantry or armored units with these weapons and, 
therefore, counterforce was not possible given this factor. Furthermore, it was not until 
1957 that the United States possessed the ability to produce a sufficiently low yield so as 
to prevent blowback that would harm American troops if they were used on the 
battlefield. It was at this point that the two kiloton Douglas MB-1 “Genie” was available, 
which was used for atomic air-to-air missile strikes against enemy bombers. 
 The Kennedy Administration took office and immediately launched a review of 
the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine of Massive Retaliation. On Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara and President Kennedy’s agenda was to create a doctrine that was not as rigid 
as Massive Retaliation and produce one that did not target cities and civilian population. 
Secretary McNamara pushed for a range of options beyond the ‘suicide or surrender’ that 
came to characterize Massive Retaliation and would come to establish what would 
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ultimately become the doctrine of Flexible Response. In this doctrine, a new strategy was 
designed to present the political leadership with a wide range of nuclear response options 
to crises. The breakthrough in miniaturized and reduced yield assets, however, allowed 
military decision makers to strongly consider the strongly counterforce slanted doctrine 
as outlined in Flexible Response. 
 The Nixon Administration’s implementation of the Schlesinger Doctrine (often 
called Controlled Response) was a hybrid of counterforce and countervalue flexible 
response options with the inclusion of ‘controlled escalation.’ Multiple Independently-
targeted Re-entry Vehicles, enhanced guidance systems, and Lance guided missiles had 
all been technical innovations during Nixon’s term as president, and American nuclear 
doctrine changed. It was with this that the Nixon Administration launched the Defense 
Program Review Committee (DPRC) and concluded that the necessities of developing a 
Limited War doctrine required greater technological requirements than previous 
strategies were built upon.  
 The Jimmy Carter Administration enacted the Countervailing Strategy doctrine, 
which was based on Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), which allowed the political and 
military leadership to reaffirm its commitment to deterrence, but it would now be policy 
to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that any aggressive action could not lead to victory 
(see quote in Chapter 4). With the availability of MIRVed warheads, enhanced guidance 
systems and improved accuracies, President Carter went a step further than Kennedy’s 
Flexible Response and Nixon’s Schlesinger Doctrine/Selective Options; the 
Countervailing Strategy allowed the President of the United States to have a doctrine that 
incorporated a tentative plan over virtually all strategic and tactical options, over the full 
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range of contingencies. While an Assured Destructive capacity was available if the 
American limited war strategy failed, this was a decidedly counterforce application of 
U.S. doctrine and it came at a time when the technical operating characteristics ultimately 
came together with reduced yield, enhanced guidance and retargeting ability, and the 
miniaturization capability that was established in the mid-1960s. The Countervailing 
Strategy would be the first truly and completely counterforce doctrine the United States 
possessed, from top to bottom as city strikes would only be considered should limited 
war graduate to a general nuclear war. 
First Strike Doctrine 
 Out of all the case studies under investigation, the Eisenhower Administration 
considered the First Strike doctrine most closely. Especially during the Korean War and 
as military decision makers considered American nuclear superiority as a ‘Wasting 
Asset’, a ‘window of vulnerability’ and a ‘window of opportunity’210 tempted President 
Eisenhower with a potential First Strike against the Soviet Union. The Administration 
was still reeling from the Soviet Union crossing the thermonuclear threshold in 1952, as 
they successfully test detonated their first fusion-based nuclear bomb; the Massive 
Retaliation doctrine “really meant massive pre-emption,”211 as the United States would 
certainly be unwilling to absorb the first blow when they had the possibility to “blunt” an 
enemy attack. Adding to U.S. vulnerability, the means of delivering a nuclear strike was 
by a SAC bomber sortie, which would have extremely high attrition rates as they 
attempted to fly their way through Soviet air defenses. It was not until 1956 that the Thor 
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Intermediate Ranged Ballistic Missile (IRBM) was available, which would greatly reduce 
the attrition numbers the American arsenal would be subject to during a nuclear strike. 
The Thor and, later, Jupiter missiles were not without their own vulnerabilities, however, 
as they possessed a limiting effective range of 1,500 nautical miles and could be fired 
only with 15-20 minutes’ notice;212 the American IRBMs would need to be based 
dangerously close to Soviet targets. In the end, although, the Eisenhower Administration 
obviously declined the tempting option of launching a preventive strike against the 
U.S.S.R., however, no Administration came so close. However, no other Administration 
was so vulnerable. 
 By the time the Kennedy Administration moved into the White House, the 
technical operating characteristics of the U.S. arsenal had become less vulnerable than 
under President Eisenhower. With the successful deployment of the Polaris SSBN 
submarine fleets, the United States had an invulnerable nuclear deterrent in their 
possession. The Polaris fleet would be able to patrol areas just off the coast of the 
U.S.S.R. undetected. The Minuteman I programme in the early 1960s was crucial to the 
achievement of American nuclear invulnerability, as the Soviet Union would not be able 
to destroy all U.S. nuclear assets in a First Strike attack. The United States, therefore, 
would no longer need to consider a First Strike doctrine of their own, and it was the 
policy of subsequent U.S. administration to not consider such a doctrine in the future. 
Launch on Warning 
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 While the historical record was promising for the hypothesis that as command, 
control, and communications (C
3
I) technology improved, states would be more likely to 
develop a launch on warning doctrine. During the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
Administrations, as early warning systems such as BMEWs, Pinetree and the DEW Line 
alerted the American military to incoming threats, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) 
system would guard against unauthorized or accidental use. At this point, nuclear surety 
would suggest that a LoW doctrine would be considered, and it was considered by both 
Eisenhower and Kennedy. During the Eisenhower years, the technology was not so 
robust as to allow this doctrine’s implementation, as the BMEW system would not come 
online until after his time expired. This is, of course, a timing problem with technology, 
but the technical operating characteristics of the early warning systems were the driving 
force behind the consideration of LoW; the doctrine was advisable when the technology 
became feasible. 
 With the establishment of negative control, that is nuclear surety that came with 
the PAL system, it would seem that a LoW doctrine would be feasible to protect 
American assets from being destroyed by a Soviet surprise attack. However, the fact that 
LoW was not actually implemented should not be seen as a failure in technology driving 
doctrine, but it was production; the new PAL technology was untested, costly at an 
estimated $23.3 million dollars,
213
 and most importantly, was only placed on a small 
number of weapons in comparison to the entire arsenal. While these issues persisted, 
launch on warning remained a discussion point at high level committee meetings and 
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memoranda. LoW seemed destined to become doctrine when the technology and testing 
allowed for it to become feasible. 
 Under the Jimmy Carter Administration, we see the nature of the relationship 
between the development of C
3
I technology and a launch on warning doctrine. As C
3
I 
technology evolved, they became increasingly sophisticated, they also became 
increasingly vulnerable to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons, false alarms, 
electronic jamming, subversion, and interference from the enemy.
214
 
 Counter to the hypothesis expected in this thesis, as C
3
I technology became more 
sophisticated and advanced, they became increasingly vulnerable to enemy interference; 
LoW doctrine, therefore, became less likely as C
3
I technology progressed. 
Future Research 
 This was an important question: does technology play a primary driving factor in 
determining nuclear doctrine. The answer is, yes, nuclear doctrine in the United States 
during the Cold War, was primarily driven by the technical operating characteristics of 
the weapons available to them. 
This thesis demonstrates that the technical operating characteristics of nuclear 
weapons were a primary driving factor in American during the Cold War. While the 
above conclusions are compelling, the structure of the longitudinal study of the United 
States does not allow these conclusions to be generalizable without more empirical work. 
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We cannot, as yet, generalise the results of these findings to the post-Cold War United 
States or in a post-nuclear Iran, etc. The next step in this research programme will be to 
test if this conclusion holds in (1) a post-Cold War, higher technology environment and, 
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